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Part I
General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self-contained research papers and addresses two
relevant topics from the eld of the economics of nancial institutions and services.
The rst topic (part II) studies issues on the economics of credit rating agencies
and consists of two theoretical research papers (chapters 3 and 4). The second topic
(part III) contributes to the economics of banking and consists of one empirical
research paper (chapter 6). Chapter 1 and 2 of this general introduction provide
an overview of the motivation, the related literature, and the main results of those
three papers.
1 Economics of Credit Rating Agencies
1.1 The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Financial Mar-
kets
Standard & Poors, one of the worlds leading credit rating agencies (in the following
CRA), denes a credit rating of a debt issue as "[...] a current opinion of the credit-
worthiness of an obligor with respect to a specic nancial obligation [...]. [...] The
opinion evaluates the obligors capacity and willingness to meet its nancial com-
mitments [...]."1 The purpose of credit ratings is therefore to decrease informational
asymmetry between an issuer of a debt instrument and investors and to improve
1see the website of Standard&Poors: www.standardandpoors.com; other CRAs use very similar
denitions of a credit rating.
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the allocation of capital. The rating process consists of qualitative, quantitative and
legal analysis and CRAs express their credit ratings by discrete rating categories.
Cantor (2001) notes that credit ratings condense a big amount of information into
one symbol, which is primarily determined by the expected loss2 of a debt instru-
ment. Crouhy et al. (2001) summarize that the qualitative analysis considers the
quality of management, the issuers competitiveness within its industry, the expected
growth of the industry, and its vulnerability to regulatory changes, labor relations,
and technological changes. The quantitative analysis is mainly concerned with the
nancial analysis of the issuer. Standard & Poors uses the letter combinations AAA
to BBB for investment-grade long term issues and BB to D for speculative-grade
long term issues. Another global CRA, Fitch Ratings, uses the same classication
as Standard & Poors, whereas Moodys uses Aaa to Baa to assign investment-grade
and Ba to C for speculative-grade. All three additionally distinguish between issue
and issuer credit ratings and long- and short-term issues. Table 1.1 provides an
overview of the di¤erent rating categories of Standard & Poors and Moodys and a
short denition for each rating category.3 With increasing volume and complexity
of nancial markets - for example with the raise of structured nance products such
as collateralized debt obligations - the reliance of both investors and regulators on
credit ratings has grown rapidly over the last years. The global issuance of rated
debt instruments increased enormously from roughly US$ 3,500 billion in the year
2002 to over 8,000 billion in 2006 - whereas structured nance products contributed
with a compound annual growth rate of 27% in that time period.4
2The expected loss of a debt instrument is dened as the product of its expected default rate
and expected loss severity. (see Cantor, 2001)
3For the ratings denitions see CRAs websites: www.standardandpoors.com, www.moodys.com
and www.tchratings.com
4The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of corporates, public nance, nancial institutions,
and sovereign rated debt issuance was 21%. The the CAGR of total global debt issue between
2002 and 2006 was 23%. Source: Moodys (2006).
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Moodys S&Ps denition
Aaa AAA highest quality, minimal credit risk
Aa1 AA+
Aa2 AA high quality, very low credit risk
Aa3 AA-
A1 A+
A2 A upper-medium quality, low credit risk
A3 A-
Baa1 BBB+
Baa2 BBB medium quality, moderate credit risk
Baa3 BBB-
Ba1 BB+
Ba2 BB speculative elements, substantial credit risk
Ba3 BB-
B1 B+
B2 B speculative elements, high credit risk
B3 B-
Caa1 CCC+
Caa2 CCC poor standing, very high credit risk
Caa3 CCC-
Ca CC highly speculative, near default
C C typically in default
D
Source: Moodys and S&Ps websites. Denitions from Moodys.
Denitions from S&Ps are very similar.
Table 1.1: Rating categories and denitions.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence shows that the role CRAs play in nancial mar-
kets is not unambiguous. On the one hand, due to the fact that the amount of rated
debt instruments increased that enormously over the last years, credit ratings seem
to be very important and valuable for nancial markets. Therefore, CRAs seem
to have enormous market inuence such as informative value for investors and ad-
vantages for debt issuers, because otherwise there would be no need for debt issuers
to spend money for expensive rating fees. On the other hand, in the recent past
CRAs very often have been criticized for publishing inaccurate credit ratings, for
their intransparent rating procedures, and have been involved in nancial and cor-
porate scandals several times. Examples are the Asian crisis, where CRAs gave
3
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Thailand an investment-grade rating until ve months after the start of the crisis,
or the Enron case, where CRAs judged Enron investment-grade until days before
it went bankrupt. Another recent example for public discussion about potentially
inglorious behavior of CRAs is the nancial crisis of 2007 that was set o¤ by the
debacle of subprime lending in the USA. Many times, the CRAs themselves refused
the allegation for having issued inaccurate credit ratings and of being jointly re-
sponsible for the above mentioned incidences. They pronounced that their credit
ratings have to be regarded as their opinions only and that they have to rely their
rating decision on information provided by debt issuers. Furthermore, CRAs often
have been suspected of being exposed to potential conicts of interest. One example
arises from the fact that the issuer of a debt instrument pays for the credit rating,
not the investors which rely their investment decision on the observed credit rating.
A CRA might be induced to publish a better credit rating, if the issuer o¤ers a
higher rating fee. Another example for conicts of interest arises from additional
consulting services, which CRAs o¤er to their clients. A CRA may then o¤er a more
favorable credit rating, if the issuer demands additional services. Again, the crisis
in subprime lending can serve as an illustration of that issue. In the recent past,
the CRAs not only issued credit ratings for structured debt instruments, but also
supported investment banks in designing such products in order to obtain a high
rating. CRAs have been criticized for cooperating too closely with the issuers of
structured debt products and for publishing too favorable credit ratings.5
A closer look at the market structure of CRAs shows that the market is domin-
ated by three big global rms (Moodys Investors Services, Standard & Poors and
Fitch Ratings). According to published data from Moodys the global industry mar-
ket share of the three big agencies was estimated to be 95% in 2006. The largest CRA
5For an overview on the role of CRAs in structured nance see for example BIS (2005).
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is Standard & Poors with a market share of 40%, followed closely by Moodys with
39% and Fitch with 16%. While Moodys is an independent joint stock company,
Standard & Poors is a subsidiary of McGraw Hill Companies and Fitch Ratings is
a subsidiary of Fimalac, a French business support services group. It has been criti-
cized several times that there is obviously a lack of competition and limited market
entry with the consequences of ine¢ ciently high rating fees and ine¢ ciently low rat-
ing quality. The rating business is extraordinary protable for the three dominant
CRAs, too. For example, the operating margin of Moodys was 61.8% in 2006 and
54.3% in 2005. Comparably high is the protability of Standard & Poors, which
achieved an operating margin of 43% in 2006 and 42.5% in 2005.6 Despite those
objections just described - market power and conicts of interest - CRAs remained
themselves largely unregulated, whereas credit ratings are extensively used in n-
ancial market regulation.7 For example, many institutional investors are restricted
to invest only in instruments with a high enough credit rating and in the context
of Basel II, capital adequacy ratios are determined according to the credit rating
of a debtor.8 For being eligible to be used for regulatory purposes in the US, a
CRA has to be "nationally recognized". For a long time only the three big agencies
have received that so called NRSRO (=nationally recognized statistical rating or-
ganization) status by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For the US,
regulatory authorities to some degree themselves are limiting market entry for other
CRAs. Market entry is therefore limited for two reasons. First, a CRA must have
enough reputation to be recognized by nancial market participants, which only can
be earned, if a CRA is already in the market. Second, regulatory authorities limit
6The sources of the data are Moodys (2006) and Standard&Poors (2007).
7See for example Economist (2005).
8For an overview on ratings used in regulation see BIS (2000) and Cantor & Packer (1994).
In the U.S., among others, banks were prohibited to purchasing "speculative securities" (1931),
Savings&Loans were prohibited from investing in below-investment-grade-bonds (1989), and money
market mutual funds were required to limit holdings of low-rated papers (1991).
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market entry, because a CRA has to be recognized by the regulator for being eligible
for regulatory purposes.9
In the past, it has frequently been argued - in the literature and by the CRAs
themselves - that reputation is the most important asset of CRAs and that therefore
self-regulation in the CRA industry works very e¢ cient and no further regulation
would be necessary. The argument was that CRAs have an incentive to maintain
a reputation for accurate and high-quality credit ratings. If investors would lose
condence in the credit ratings of a certain CRA and if therefore debt issuers would
no longer believe that credit ratings would reduce nance costs, debt issuers would
no longer be willing to obtain a costly credit rating (see Cantor & Packer, 1994).
However, the lack of competition in the CRA industry and the points of criticism
mentioned above raise the suspicion that the threat of losing reputation may be
not enough to assure high rating quality. In theory, CRAs have an incentive to
issue accurate credit ratings and to avoid conicts of interest in order to preserve
their reputations. However, Partnoy (1999) argues that "[...] once the ratings of a
small number of credit rating agencies are enshrined by regulators who incorporate
credit ratings into substantive regulation, the markets become less vigilant about
the agencies reputation."
More recently, the discussion on tighter regulation of CRAs is active among
institutions of nancial market supervision - especially after the nancial crisis of
2007, but also already before.10 One goal of the U.S. "Credit Rating Agency Re-
form Act 2006", which passed legislation in September 2006, is the promotion of
competition and cilitation of market entry, fostering accountability, transparency,
and investor protection.11 In 2004, the international organization of securities com-
9See White (2001).
10See for example Economist (2005, 2008).
11See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (2006).
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missions (IOSCO) published a code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs, with the
goal to increase the accuracy of credit ratings and to reduce conicts of interest (see
IOSCO, 2004). After the subprime loan crisis in 2007, the EU-commission and US
politicians blamed the CRAs for being jointly responsible for the credit crisis. The
EU-commission considered to react with legal restrictions for the CRAs and also US
authorities considered to investigate the role of CRAs in the credit crisis of 2007.
1.2 Literature and Motivation
Regarding the academic literature, Richard Cantor (2004) points to the fact that
the literature on the role of CRAs has almost exclusively an empirical focus. Nev-
ertheless, the literature on CRAs can be separated into three categories. The rst
category is literature on the credit rating industry, where articles describe the current
and past situation and provide arguments on what should be changed by regulatory
intervention or why the present oligopolistic market structure with a few dominating
agencies is or is not e¢ cient, as for example Hill (2004), White (2001), Schwarcz
(2001), Partnoy (1999) or Cantor & Packer (1994). Unfortunately, the contributions
in this literature category have in common a lack of theoretical foundation.
The second and clearly largest category is empirical literature on the role and
performance of CRAs. For example, Ellis (1998) analyzes whether debt issuers and
investors agree on the meaning of credit ratings. The paper shows that issuers feel
that credit ratings overstate the riskiness of bonds while investors feel the oppos-
ite. In a similar study, Baker & Mansi (2002) show that investors and debt issuers
substantially di¤er in their assessment whether credit ratings accurately reect cred-
itworthiness. Amato & Furne (2004) study whether the business cycle inuences
credit ratings. They nd evidence that credit ratings generally do not exhibit ex-
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cess sensitivity to the business cycle. Whether CRAs are exposed to conicts of
interest is investigated by Covitz & Harrison (2003). Measuring the anticipation of
rating changes, they nd evidence that reputational incentives might dominate the
rating decision of CRAs. However, they do not analyze whether the initial rating
levels might be biased by conicts of interest. Dodd & Setty (2003) nd evidence
that credit ratings have an impact on capital ows to developing countries. Galil
(2003) analyzes empirically the quality of corporate credit ratings and provides evid-
ence that credit ratings could be improved by using publicly available information
and that some categorizations of credit ratings are not informative. Doherty et al.
(2007) nd evidence that competition in the CRA sector improves the quality of
credit ratings. Brookeld & Ormrod (2000) analyze the impact of credit ratings on
bond yields. They nd that the o¢ cial recognition of credit ratings has no market-
based role and that credit ratings are used because of the success of the major CRAs
in performing their market function. Lö­ er (2004, 2005) analyzes whether CRAs
follow their claimed concept of rating-through-the-cycleand shows with simula-
tions and empirical evidence that CRAs change credit ratings, if it is unlikely to
be reversed shortly afterwards. Lö­ er (2007) concludes that market-based meas-
ures and credit ratings have complementary characteristics, and he shows that one
should give more weight to credit ratings as the risk of debt issuers decreases, or the
investment horizon increases.
In the small category of theoretical literature, Millon & Thakor (1984) analyze
the rationale why CRAs exist and motivate their existence with the possibility of
information and risk sharing. They conclude that CRAs might not have an incent-
ive to employ costly e¤ort into the process of information production. However,
neither conicts of interest nor regulation of CRAs are considered. Regulation is
not considered either in Kuhner (2001), where the role of CRAs in times of enhanced
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systemic risk, with CRAs acting as frontrunners in a Bayesian herding process, is
analyzed. Boom (2001) concentrates on the demand and the price for a credit
rating of a monopolistic credit rating agency. But again, no regulatory issues are
incorporated explicitly in the model. Mukhopadhyay (2004) analyzes the behavior
of CRAs under consideration of moral hazard aspects. The model motivates the
moral hazard problem with unobservable evaluation standards, which CRAs use in
the rating process, and shows, somewhat questionable from a policy perspective,
that a regulator can enforce an evaluation standard with incentive payments to the
CRA. But again, this contribution neither considers conicts of interest between the
CRA and the rated issuer nor welfare implications of regulation. Another interest-
ing theoretical motivation for the role of CRAs in nancial markets is formulated in
Boot et al. (2006). They show that issued credit ratings may act as a coordination
mechanism in the presence of multiple equilibria and that credit ratings may be sta-
bility improving. Despite those valuable results, issues regarding possible conicts
of interest, moral hazard and regulation of CRAs are not addressed in this paper.
The motivation for doing research on CRAs arises from two sources. The rst
one is that the practical relevance of credit ratings and CRAs increased enormously,
especially during the last years. The growth in rated debt issues points to the fact
that CRAs and their credit ratings play a very meaningful role in global nancial
markets. As mentioned above, CRAs frequently were confronted with criticism.
Open questions regarding the role CRAs actually play and the regulation of CRAs
are frequently discussed among the public press as well as nancial market institu-
tions. The other source of motivation is that the theoretical literature on CRAs and
credit ratings is not yet comprehensive as the relevance of several points of criticism
has not yet been analyzed theoretically.
Two chapters in that dissertation contribute to an understanding of the debate
9
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on the role of CRAs and their regulation. Those two chapters pick up two sources
of criticism with which CRAs were confronted frequently in the past. Chapter 3
analyzes on the optimal regulation of CRAs in a theoretical framework. The paper
motivates intransparent rating methodologies and potential conicts of interest as
a rationale for regulation and discusses the implications for optimal regulation from
a welfare perspective. Chapter 4 investigates the role of CRAs regarding nancial
market stability in a theoretical framework. The main emphasis in that chapter is
placed on the inuence of the level of rating fees, mandatory and voluntary credit
ratings, and which party pays the fee on nancial market stability. This chapter
focuses therefore on potential adverse e¤ects of market power and ine¢ cient high
rating fees from a perspective of nancial market stability.
1.3 The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
The rst paper (chapter 3) studies the optimal regulation of CRAs in a model where
rating quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. In the applied
theoretical framework, credit ratings helps to allocate investment more e¢ ciently,
meaning that the informative value of a credit rating is positive. The model, which
is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), motivates a rationale for regulation by
showing that due to unobservable rating quality the allocation of investment becomes
ine¢ cient and social welfare ine¢ ciently low in comparison to the rst-best result.
Incentives for moral hazard arise, because the CRA has an incentive to employ lower
rating quality in order to reduce costs, which leads to inaccurate credit ratings. In a
next step, we introduce a regulator, which has a costly technology, that may detect
compliance with a minimum rating standard with a certain probability. The model
shows that the optimal rating standard is lower than the rst-best rating quality.
10
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In order to give consideration to the criticism that CRAs may be exposed to
conicts of interest, the model is extended in a next step by assuming that CRAs
do not only o¤er the service of rating but also have the ability to o¤er additional
consulting services to the rated issuer of a debt instrument. The compensation for
consulting services can be used by the rated debt issuer to bribe the CRA in order to
get the desired good credit rating. However, the e¤ect of possible collusion on social
welfare is not unambiguous. On the one hand, collusion leads to inaccurate credit
ratings, which leads to less e¢ cient investment and therefore to a reduction of social
welfare. On the other hand, by rating an issuer of a debt instrument, the CRA has
gained expertise to provide additional consulting services at lower costs, compared
to an external rm, which leads to an increase in social welfare. Hence, the possible
strategy for the regulator is either to forbid the joint provision of services or to
allow it. If the regulator allows the joint provision of services, the optimal rating
standard is lower compared to the case of forbidding it, because a higher rating
standard invokes the CRAs to accept the bribe more often. Using social welfare
as the decision criterion, it is not always optimal to forbid the joint provision of
services. We show that the decision of the regulator depends on the size of the bribe
and on the e¢ ciency of regulation. If the bribe is su¢ ciently small and e¢ ciency
of regulation su¢ ciently high, it is optimal to allow the joint provision of services
and not to prevent the possibility of collusion ex-ante. However, if the bribe is
su¢ ciently large and the e¢ ciency of regulation technology su¢ ciently small, social
welfare could be increased, if the joint provision of services would be forbidden.
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1.4 Credit Rating Agencies and Financial Market Stability
The second paper (chapter 4) asks and answers two main questions in a theoret-
ical framework. The rst question is, in how far the useful role of credit ratings is
inuenced by the size of the rating fee. By analyzing that question, we give con-
sideration to adverse e¤ects of market power of some few CRAs, which obviously
have the possibility to set higher rating fees compared to the competitive level. The
second question is, in how far the valuable role of credit ratings is inuenced by
the way CRAs exactly generate their revenues and whether credit ratings should be
mandatory rather than voluntary. The paper is an extension of the model in Boot
et al. (2006), who show that CRAs can help to increase nancial market stabil-
ity by coordinating investorsexpectations in situations, where multiple equilibria
exist. Under certain conditions, the decision of the debt issuer to invest in either
a good or a bad portfolio depends on the expectations of the external investors.
Hence, multiple equilibria are present for credit qualities of a good portfolio in an
intermediate range. In the model framework, the role of CRAs can be described as
acting as a coordination mechanism. The key assumption is that a certain fraction
of the investor community, which are characterized as "institutional investors", is
restricted by regulation to invest only in instruments with low risk and with a credit
rating that reects investment-grade. In the presence of multiple equilibria, those
institutional investors, which rely their investment decision on the observed credit
rating, can lead the debt issuer to choose the low risk portfolio and hence to establish
the desired "good" equilibrium and therefore to reduce nancial market fragility.
By extending the approach of Boot et al. (2006), we show that the size of the
rating fee and the question, which party pays the fee - issuer of a debt instrument
or investors - inuences the utility of credit ratings. We show that a reduction of
12
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the rating fee always increases nancial market stability and that it may be optimal
to charge the rating fee from institutional investors, which base their investment
decision on the observed credit rating, instead of the issuer of a debt instrument.
Furthermore, the model concludes that mandatory credit ratings may be more valu-
able than voluntary credit ratings.
2 Economics of Banking
2.1 The Capital Decision of Banks
Costly bank capital has been motivated in the theoretical literature with real life
observations and with the special function of the banks as liquidity providers, among
others. Most of the time, however, the modelling approaches used result in a corner
solution of the regulatory capital requirement (see e.g. Bolton & Freixas, 2000, and
Helman et al., 2000). As a consequence, a lot of theoretical literature concentrates
on regulatory incentives. The real life observation of bank capital being around the
regulatory minimum requirements is, however, somewhat questionable. In particular
in less developed countries, banks seem to exhibit much higher capital levels. This
raises the question of a possible trade-o¤ in the banks capital decision.
In explaining the costs of bank capital, two complementary theories based on the
liquidity creation function of the bank have emerged. Whereas Diamond & Rajan
(2000, 2001) stress the asset side, Gorton & Winton (1995, 2000) derive a relation
between the cost of capital and the heterogenous liquidity needs of consumers that
buy shares. The basic trade-o¤ in Diamond & Rajan (2000) between deposits and
capital is that on the one hand, more capital, due to the hold-up problem between
the bank as a relationship lender and the capital owners, increases the rents ex-
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tracted by the bank and decreases the amount the bank is able to raise and invest.
On the other hand, deposits, due to the sequential service principle, alleviate the
rent extraction problem, but increase the probability of ine¢ cient liquidation of the
bank in presence of uncertainty on asset values. Diamond & Rajan (2000) assume
that there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity or of capital. Therefore, the supply
side does not play a role here. The model implicates that the amount of capital
is higher the more uncertainty there is, the less developed the nancial market is
and the smaller the market is. Gorton & Winton (1995) o¤er another approach
for costly capital in a general equilibrium model. In the model, capital is inform-
ationally sensitive, and because information is costly, there are both informed and
non-informed traders in the market. Unlike in Diamond & Rajan (2000), the distri-
bution of shares now matters. Since consumers have heterogenous liquidity needs,
these needs determine the cost of capital. Therefore, in addition to the character-
istics of the market where the bank operates, the characteristics of the shareholders
make a di¤erence. Implications of Gorton & Winton (1995) are that the amount
of capital is higher, the lower the liquidity needs of the shareholders are and the
wealthier they are. Empirical literature on bank capital has mainly concentrated
on bank specic factors as explanatory variables, like in Altunbas & al. (2000) and
Barrios & Blanco (2003) for Spain, Yu (2000) for Taiwan and De Bondt & Prast
(1999) for ve European Union (EU) countries and for the US. All these papers nd
evidence that bank specic, solvency related factors such as return on equity, bad
loans, and liquidity measures matter. Additionally, regulatory pressure seems to
matter in Spain. However, none of the contributions controls for factors that may
have to do with the shareholder characteristics. For the US, Marcus (1983) and later
on Benston & al. (2003) nd evidence that the tax treatment of capital items and
deposits has had a signicant e¤ect on the amount of bank capital. But again, the
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institutional environment in their study a¤ects the demand of capital of the banks,
not the supply by the shareholders.
2.2 Costly Bank Capital - Demand and Supply Side Con-
siderations
The third paper of the dissertation (chapter 6) asks what drives the capital decision
of a bank and in particular whether supply side restrictions play a determinant
role.12 In so doing, we take directly a stand on a debate in modern theories of bank
capital determination. We test the determinants of bank capital in ve Central
and Eastern European and the three Baltic (CEB) countries that have recently
joined the EU. We analyze whether there is a di¤erence in the bank capital ratios
between multinational and national banks in one specic market. With the empirical
analysis of bank capital of national and multinational banks, operating in the CEB
countries, we are able to analyze supply and demand side factors separately, in
order to discriminate between the theories of Diamond & Rajan (2000) and Gorton
& Winton (1995). Focusing on subsidiaries of multinational banks in our sample,
we investigate whether the home market conditions have an impact on bank capital,
when the e¤ect of host country factors is controlled for. This is possible due to
the fact that in the sample of subsidiaries of multinational banks the market of
the source of capital di¤ers from the market of operation. Furthermore we derive
stability implications of international banking in a specic market area.
The CEB region is a good candidate to analyze these questions because it hosts
many international banks and is almost entirely a host market. Summary statistics
show that there is a robust di¤erence between the capital ratios of domestic and
12This paper is based on joint work with Katri Mikkonen.
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foreign banks, indicating that the supply side may matter. A closer look at the
stock market measures and the GDP per capita in the home and the host countries
reveals that there is a large di¤erence between the two markets. Using panel data
methods, we nd evidence that home country factors, attributable to the supply
side of bank capital, play a signicant role in determining bank capital. Further-
more we nd a signicant positive impact of host country factors which refer to the
demand side of bank capital. Both observations reveal that banks face a trade-o¤
between costly bank capital and the probability of being allowed to continue their
operations and preserve their charter value. Our results suggest that international
banks can improve the stability of nancial markets even if investment is made in
terms of subsidiaries, if the host market su¤ers from a domestic shortage of capital.
However, as the di¤erence between the home and host capital markets becomes
smaller, the motives driving internationalization may change. It may then be that
the international banks are both more likely to go bankrupt and leave the market
when bad times occur.
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Part II
Credit Rating Agencies
3 The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating
Agencies
3.1 Introduction
Credit rating agencies (CRA) play a very meaningful role in todays nancial mar-
kets. According to Moodys (2007) - the second largest CRA worldwide - , the
volume of rated debt issues increased globally from US$ 3,500 billion in the year 2002
to over 8,000 billion in 2006. In principle, credit ratings should serve as third-party
opinions about the solvency of a debt instrument and should reduce the information
asymmetry between an issuer of a debt instrument and the potential investors, and
therefore improve e¢ ciency and transparency in nancial markets. The CRAs pro-
nounce that their credit ratings should not be interpreted as default probabilities
and that credit ratings are rather opinions about risk only. The higher is the credit
rating of a debt instrument, the less likely it should be to default and the longer it
should take to default. A closer look at corporate scandals and nancial crisis during
the last years reveals that CRAs have been involved several times and have been
confronted with heavy criticism for publishing inaccurate credit ratings. Examples
are the Asian crisis, where the CRAs gave Thailand an investment-grade rating until
ve months after the start of the crisis or the Enron case, where the CRAs gave En-
ron investment-grade until days before it went bankrupt. Another recent example
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for public discussion about the behavior of CRAs is the debacle of subprime lending
in the USA with its impact on nancial markets globally.13 Furthermore, CRAs
very often are confronted with the suspicion of being exposed to conicts of interest
as mostly the issuers of the debt instrument pay for the credit rating, which fees
account for about 90 per cent of the CRAsrevenues, and as CRAs o¤er additional
consulting services to their clients. Again, the crisis in subprime lending can serve as
an illustration of that issue. The CRAs not only issued credit ratings for structured
nance instruments, but also supported investment banks in designing them (see for
example Mason & Rosner, 2007).
Despite these objections, CRAs remained themselves largely unregulated, but the
discussion on further regulation is active in the media as well as in institutions of
nancial market supervision. In 2005 the SEC (securities and exchange commission)
published a report on the behavior of CRAs and issued a concept release on how the
regulation of CRAs should be changed. Amongst others regulation would be needed
for requirements on the qualications of rating-analysts, the avoidance of conicts of
interest in the presence of additional services of CRAs and the current monitoring of
CRAs.14 In 2004 the IOSCO15 published a code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs
in which was proposed amongst others that the quality and integrity of the rating-
procedure should be warranted and that credit ratings should be free from conicts
of interest.16 In September 2006, the U.S. legislations passed the "Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act 2006", with the goal to improve the quality of credit ratings
13Due to the rise in housing prices the volume of subprime loans increased rapidly. Those loans
where securitized into mortgage backed securities and again these were securitized into collater-
alized debt obligations (CDOs). Those complex debt contracts received a very high rating from
the CRAs, comparable to government bonds. In the rst half of 2007 CDOs lost almost 40% of
their value. In order to limit turbulences, the ECB injected around 200 billion Euro and the FED
around 40 billion US Dollars emergency liquidity in August 2007.
14see Ban (2004)
15The IOSCO (International organization of securities commissions) is a union of national insti-
tutions of nancial supervision of over one hundred countries.
16see IOSCO (2004) and Ban (2004).
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"for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering accountability,
transparency, and competition in the credit rating industry" (see CRA Reform Act,
2006). After the subprime loan crisis in 2007, the EU-commission and US politicians
blamed the CRAs of being jointly responsible for the nancial crisis. The EU-
commission considered to react with legal regulations for the credit rating agencies
and also US authorities announced to investigate the role of CRAs in the subprime
loan crisis that was set o¤ in August 2007. However, very little progress has been
made in implementing those proposals in national laws and regulations.
This paper contributes to the question whether CRAs should be regulated and
especially concentrates on the allegation of inaccurate credit ratings and adverse
e¤ects of conicts of interest. The paper studies the optimal regulation of CRAs
in a model where rating quality is unobservable and enforcement of regulation is
costly. The applied theoretical model is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), where
the regulation of auditing rms is analyzed. The model considers a representative
investment bank17 that wants to invest in a risky portfolio and needs to raise debt
from external investors to nance the investment. A CRA has a costly evaluation
technology and issues a credit rating for the debt contract, which is made available
for external investors. The credit rating is based on the risk of the underlying
portfolio and a credit rating is being issued, if a CRA is assigned by the investment
bank. In the setup, the external investors use the credit rating for their investment
decision and the credit rating helps to allocate investment more e¢ ciently, compared
to the case without a credit rating. If rating quality is unobservable, the CRA has
an incentive to lower the rating quality, because the costs can then be reduced and
hence the prots increased.
17By using an investment bank in our model setup we give consideration to the extensive public
discussion about the role of credit rating agencies in the subprime loan crisis in 2007. Our model
of course can be generalized by using the term "rm" or "nancial intermediary", that has a risky
investment project and needs external funds to nance the project.
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The model motivates a rationale for regulation by showing that due to the un-
observable rating quality the allocation of investment becomes ine¢ cient and social
welfare ine¢ ciently low. In a next step a regulator with a costly technology may de-
tect compliance with a minimum rating standard with a certain probability. Being
benevolent, the regulator decides on the minimum rating standard and the costly
detection e¤ort employed in regulation in order to maximize social welfare. The
introduction of regulation leads to the trade-o¤ that more e¢ cient allocation of
investment leads to a rise in social welfare, but because regulation is costly, to a re-
duction in social welfare. The results show that the optimal rating standard is lower
than the rst-best rating quality. In order to give consideration to the fact that
CRAs may be exposed to conicts of interest, the model is extended in a next step
by assuming that the rated issuer may bribe the CRA in exchange for a better credit
rating and that CRAs do not only rate but also have the ability to o¤er consulting
services.18 It will be shown that with the joint provision of ratings and consulting
services the possibility of collusion may arise, which could have negative e¤ects on
social welfare. The model shows that on the one hand the regulator could get rid
of the collusion problem by forbidding the joint provision of ratings and consulting
services, but on the other hand that this may not always be optimal from a welfare
perspective. That chapter gives a contribution to the theoretical literature on CRAs
by lling the gap on the optimal regulation of CRAs and by giving consideration to
broadly discussed issues regarding the alleged inglorious role of CRAs in nancial
markets in the recent past.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a
review of the related literature about the role of CRAs in nancial markets and the
18Associated with the subprime loan crisis in August 2007, CRAs were under suspicion to give
too favourable credit ratings for structured debt products, because CRAs did not only rate the
products, but also were involved in designing products with a good credit rating.
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regulation of CRAs. Section 3.3 introduces the framework of the model, motivates
the rationale for regulation when rating quality is unobservable and analyzes the
optimal regulation. In section 3.4 the model is extended by introducing conicts of
interest between the issuer of the debt instrument and the CRAs which may emerge
by the joint provision of ratings and additional consulting services. Finally, section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Richard Cantor (2004) points to the fact that the literature on the role of CRAs has
almost exclusively an empirical focus. In the small category of theoretical literature,
Millon and Thakor (1984) analyze the rationale, why CRAs exist and motivate
their existence with the possibility of information and risk sharing. They conclude
that CRAs might not have an incentive to employ costly e¤ort into the process
of information production. However, neither conicts of interest nor regulation of
CRAs are considered. Regulation is not considered either in Kuhner (2001), who
analyzes the role of CRAs in times of enhanced systemic risk, where CRAs act
as frontrunners in a Bayesian herding process. Boom (2001) concentrates on the
demand and the price for a rating of a monopolistic rating agencies. But again, no
regulatory issues are incorporated explicitly in the model. Mostly related with our
approach is the contribution of Mukhopadhyay (2004), where moral hazard aspects
are considered. That paper motivates the moral hazard problem with unobservable
evaluation standards, which CRAs use in the rating process, and show, somewhat
questionable from a policy perspective, that a regulator can enforce an evaluation
standard with incentive payments to the rating agency. But again, this contribution
neither considers conicts of interest between the CRA and the rated rm nor welfare
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implications of regulation. Another interesting theoretical motivation for the role
of CRAs in nancial markets is Boot et al. (2006). They show that credit ratings
can act as a coordination mechanism in the presence of multiple equilibria and that
credit ratings then have the ability to improve nancial market stability. Despite
those valuable results, issues regarding possible conicts of interest, moral hazard
and regulation of CRAs are not addressed in this paper. As will be shown in section
3 in more detail, credit ratings of CRAs and auditing reports of auditing rms
are products with related characteristics. Hence, the framework of analyzing the
behavior and regulation of auditing rms is closely related to the analysis of CRAs.
Dye (1993) analyzes the role of auditing standards and litigation against auditors.
They derive auditorsresponses to auditing standards and optimal liability rules.
Pagano & Immordino (2007) extend the analysis of auditing rms by focusing on
unobservable auditing quality, conicts of interest and optimal regulation.
3.3 The Model
This section introduces a framework for analyzing the regulation of credit rating
agencies. The model is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), where the optimal
regulation of auditing is analyzed, and on Dye (1993), who studies the relationship
between auditing standards and auditors wealth. The rationale for regulation will be
derived by the assumption that the quality of credit ratings is neither observable nor
contractible. It will be shown that a minimum rating standard, set by the regulator,
can improve the outcome from a welfare perspective. The regulatory issues for
auditing rms in Pagano & Immordino (2007) are closely related to those of CRAs.
Similar to CRAs, auditing rms serve as information providers for investors and
are assigned and remunerated by the audited rm. One di¤erence is that auditing
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rms provide information to shareholders, who provide equity, whereas the CRAs
provide information to investors, which provide debt nance. Another di¤erence is
that rms are legally forced very often to be audited whereas getting rated is mostly
voluntary. At last, the product of auditing rms and CRAs is di¤erent from a legal
perspective. As mentioned in the introduction, until today a credit rating has to be
regarded as an opinion on the default probability only, whose accuracy cannot be
sued by the clients of the CRA in contrast to auditing rms.19
At rst we construct a benchmark model with the assumption that the rating
quality is observable and contractible. After relaxing this assumption, we show
in a next step that the equilibrium rating quality becomes ine¢ ciently low. By
introducing a regulator with a costly detection technology, we show that a minimum
rating standard improves e¢ ciency in the allocation of investment and that welfare
will be increased. Taking into account that CRAs in the real world have often been
blamed to prot from market power, we extend our analysis by distinguishing the
cases of perfect competition and market power in the CRA sector.
3.3.1 Investment Bank, Investors, and the Credit Rating Agency
We assume an environment with universal risk neutrality and a continuum of in-
vestment banks (IB). A representative IB has the possibility to invest in a risky
portfolio. To nance investment of the portfolio, it has to raise debt nance d from
external investors.20 The goal of the representative IB is to maximize its prots
from its investment possibilities. Without debt nance, we assume that the IB is
19In the aftermath of the Enron debacle, CRAs avoided regulatory scrutiny and litigation in
contrast to auditing rms, who were convicted to pay high nes. Also the regulatory oversight of
auditing rms was strengthend in contrast to CRAs (see for example Zachariahs, 2007).
20We assume that the IB has no own funds initially and therefore has to nance its operation
entirely via debt. To keep the model tractable, we assume that external investors require an interest
rate of zero.
23
3. THE OPTIMAL REGULATION OF CRAS
not able to invest and the nal prot of the IB would then be zero.
The risk of the portfolio can be characterized as follows: the nal return of the
portfolio may turn out to be high or low, so there are two possible states (s) of
the portfolio s = g (good) or s = b (bad). The type of the portfolio is a priori
unknown to the IB. If the portfolio is in the good state, its nal value e	 is given
by a high payo¤ 	g, and if the portfolio is in the bad state, the nal value e	 is
given by a low payo¤ 	b. We assume that each investment bank in the economy
invests only in one portfolio in one period. Therefore, the nal value of the portfolio
is equal to the gross prot of the IB in one period. The portfolio will be in the
good state with unconditional probability p and in the bad state with probability
1   p. Since we assume a continuum of IBs, the unconditional probability p is
also the fraction of IBs in the economy, which has the possibility to invest in a
good portfolio.21 We assume that p is exogenous and a priori known by the IBs
and the external investors and that neither IBs nor investors have further private
information about the quality of the portfolio. If the portfolio is in the good state,
the payo¤ is assumed to be higher than the required debt repayment to the investors
d, but if the project turns out to be in the bad state, the payo¤ is assumed to be
lower than d: 	g > d > 	b. Given that the fraction of good IBs p is publicly
known, the expected unconditional gross prot of the representative IB is given by
	 = p	g + (1  p)	b. We assume that the expected gross prot of the IB exceeds
the required debt repayment (	 > d). Therefore, risk neutral investors are willing
to provide debt nance, given the information about p. Obviously, all IBs that seek
debt nance, will be served irrespective if their portfolio is actually good or bad.
The representative credit rating agency (CRA) has a costly technology that
enables the CRA to distinguish, whether an IB has the possibility to invest in a
21In the paper we will analogously use the terms "good" IB and "bad" IB.
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good or a bad portfolio. A single CRA is assumed to rate only one portfolio per
period. The CRA is able to detect a signal about the state of the IBs portfolio and
accordingly issues a credit rating r that reects whether the banks portfolio is good
or bad. If the CRA comes to the conclusion that the portfolio is good, it issues a
good credit rating r = g and reversely a bad credit rating r = b.22 Since the rating
technology is costly, the CRA charges a rating fee  from the rated investment bank.
The issued credit rating, which is made available to external investors, inuences the
expected prots of the IB and the decision of the investors to provide debt nance.23
According to Dye (1993)24 we assume that the CRA can choose the precision of the
signal about the state of the rated portfolio. We interpret the precision of the CRA
as the quality of a credit rating q. The quality of a credit rating can be interpreted as
the qualication of the sta¤, the information technology or the internal organization
of the CRA. The CRA can choose the quality of the credit rating q 2 [0; 1]. The
rating technology is assumed to be perfectly accurate, if the CRA observes a good
signal, but that it may be inaccurate after observing a bad signal. The conditional
probabilities that the issued credit ratings after observing a good and a bad signal
are correct are given by:
Pr(r = g j s = g; q) = 1 (1)
Pr(r = b j s = b; q) = q
It is obvious that the credit rating is always accurate in the case of a good signal.
22A good credit rating r=g can be regarded as reecing an "investment grade" credit rating and
a bad credit rating r=b as a "speculative grade" credit rating.
23Since we assume that an IB invests in only one portfolio for which it seeks external nance,
the rating of the portfolio is identical to a rating of the IB itself. Unlike in reality, the model does
not discriminate between issuer and issue credit ratings.
24The assumptions on the rating technology of the CRA are based on Dye (1993), who analyzes
the relationship between auditing standards, auditors wealth and litigation.
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In the case of a bad signal, the accuracy of the credit rating increases with the quality
that is employed in the rating process. The technology of the CRA can be described
in such a way that credit ratings are biased upwards, meaning that after observing a
good signal, the credit rating is perfectly accurate, but after observing a bad signal
only with a certain probability. In the case of a bad signal, the CRA will issue an
inaccurately good credit rating with a probability (1   q), while the probability of
issuing a bad credit rating after observing a good signal is zero.25
Given the technology of the CRA, the conditional probability of a rated portfolio
being in a bad state after getting a bad credit rating can be calculated using Bayes
rule:
Pr(s = b j r = b) = Pr(s = b \ r = b)
Pr(r = b)
= 1;
while the conditional probability of a portfolio with a bad credit rating, being in
a good state is given by:
Pr(s = g j r = b) = 0:
The probability that the rated IB is in a good state, conditional on a good credit
rating, is given by the following expression:
Pr(s = g j r = g) = Pr(s = g \ r = g)
Pr(r = g)
=
p
p+ (1  p) (1  q) ;
while the probability that the rated IB is in a bad state, conditional on a good
credit rating, is given by:
Pr(s = b j r = g) = (1  p) (1  q)
p+ (1  p) (1  q) :
25With that assumption about the technology of CRA we take into account the real world
criticism that CRA may issue too favourable ratings and that ratings may be inaccurately adjusted
in the case of a deterioration of an instruments or a rms conditions.
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Using the conditional probabilities above, the expected nal prot of the rated
IB after deduction of the debt repayment to external investors d, conditional on a
good credit rating, can be formulated as:
E (r = g) = Pr(s = g j r = g)	g + Pr(s = b j r = g)	b   d
 ! E(r = g) = p	g + (1  p) (1  q)	b
p+ (1  p) (1  q)   d  	  d: (2)
and the expected nal prot of the rated IB, conditional on a bad credit rating
can be written as:
E (r = b) = Pr(s = g j r = b)	g + Pr(s = b j r = b)	b   d
 ! E (r = b) = 	b   d < 0:
Given the technology of the CRA, the expected prot of the rated IB in the case
of a good credit rating is larger than the expected prot without a credit rating (see
equation (2)). Conversely, the expected value of the IB with a bad credit rating is
smaller compared with the case without a credit rating (	b < 	). Since 	b < d, it
is rational for the external investors not to provide d and the nal expected prot
in the case of a bad rating is zero (E (r = b) = 0). It is obvious that investment
will only take place in the cases of a good credit rating or without a credit rating,
since the expected prot of the IB is positive in these two cases, meaning that the
investors get back their funds. In the case of a bad credit rating investors are not
willing to provide debt nance.26
26The pivotal criterion for external investors is the expected prot of the IB. The group of
external investors is assumed to be homogenous and they are not restricted by regulation to invest
only in products with a certain credit rating.
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The question on hand is: when is the IB willing to obtain a credit rating from a
CRA? The IB can only observe the unconditional probability p and is only willing
to pay a rating fee  for a credit rating, if the expected prot with a credit rating
is larger than the expected prot without a credit rating. The expected prot with
credit rating net of the rating fee is given by:
R = Pr (r = g)E(r = g) + Pr(r = b)E(r = b)  :
If no credit rating is assigned, the expected prot is given by: n = 	   d. The
expected prot of a credit rating for the IB (IB) that can be interpreted as the
"informative value" is therefore given by:
IB = R   n (3)
 ! IB = q (1  p) (d 	b)   (3)
If equation (3) is larger or equal zero
 
IB  0

, a credit rating has informative
value and it is then optimal for the IB to obtain a credit rating.27 If instead equation
(3) would be negative
 
IB < 0

, the credit rating has no informative value and
henceforth the IB would decide not to assign a credit rating. In that case, credit
ratings do not play a useful role. From equation (3) can be derived that the value
added of a credit rating is increasing in the quality of the credit rating q, decreasing in
the unconditional probability p and the rating fee . If the fraction of good portfolios
becomes larger, the informative value of a credit rating decreases. Furthermore,
equation (3) is increasing in the term (d 	b), which can be interpreted as a measure
27We assume that credit ratings are not mandatory. If equation (3) is zero, the IB is indi¤erent
between getting a rating or not. In case of indi¤erence we assume that the IB chooses to obtain a
credit rating.
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Figure 3.1: Interactions between CRA, IB, and investors.
of potential misallocated investment that can be prevented by a credit rating of a
CRA about the IBs portfolio. The larger the possible misallocation, the higher
is the value of the credit rating. To simplify notation in the following, we dene
m  d   	b. We assume that the parameters p, , 	b and d are public observable
and given exogenous. Hence, the value of equation (3) depends on the rating quality,
which is set by the CRA. Obviously, if the rating quality would be observable for the
IB, the IB would be able to observe the exact value of the credit rating via equation
(3), while it is not the case if rating quality would be unobservable. We take a closer
look at that issue in part 3.3.2. Figure 3.1 summarizes the interactions between the
three agents - IB, CRA and external investors - in the framework of the model.
3.3.2 Demand and Supply of Observable and Unobservable Rating Qual-
ity
We assume that the CRA produces only one credit rating per period and that it
faces costs per rating c(q), which are increasing and convex in the rating quality q.28
Revenues are created by charging a rating fee  from the rated IB. Regarding the
28The cost function has the following properties: c0(q) > 0, c00(q) > 0 with lim
q!0
c(q) = 0 and
lim
q!1
c(q) =1, and c(0) = 0.
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setting of the rating fee we distinguish the case of perfect competition and market
power in the sector of CRAs.
i. More CRAs than clients: If there are more CRAs than clients in the
economy, the situation can be regarded as perfect competition among CRAs. In that
scenario, the CRA would set the rating fee equal to the costs per rating: (q) = c (q)
and therefore make zero prots. If the quality of the credit rating is observable and
contractible, the IB would demand a rating quality that maximizes the additional
prot of getting rated in equation (3) that includes the rating fee (q). We have
assumed above that the costs per rating are increasing and convex in q. Since the
rating fee  has to cover the costs per rating, the rating fee is increasing and convex
in q, too. Due to the convexity of c, the IBs prot from getting rated
 
IB

,
expressed in equation (4), is concave and maximization with respect to the rating
quality leads to an internal maximum:
max
q
IB (q) = q (1  p)m  c (q) (4)
The rst order condition is given by:
(1  p)m = c0 (q) (5)
If the rating quality would be observable and contractible, the IB would require a
quality, where the marginal cost of increasing the rating quality equals the marginal
revenue of a higher rating quality. Solving the rst order condition for q leads to
the rst-best rating quality q 2 [0; 1]. The characteristics of the rst-best rating
quality are summarized in proposition 1.29
29All proofs are located in the appendix.
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Proposition 1 If rating quality is observable and contractible, the rst-best rating
quality q becomes smaller, if the unconditional probability of the IBs portfolio being
in a good state p increases and becomes larger, if the size of the potential misalloca-
tion of investment m without a rating increases. The rst-best rating quality becomes
larger, if the marginal costs per rating c0 (q) become smaller.
The value of getting a credit rating becomes larger, if the fraction of good port-
folios in the economy decreases. Therefore it is optimal for the IB to demand a
higher rating quality and to pay a higher fee for the CRAs rating service. From the
optimality condition (5) it is obvious that a credit rating becomes more valuable,
the higher is the potential loss m, if the IBs portfolio turns out to be in a bad state,
expressed in a higher amount of debt relative to the portfolios payo¤ in the bad
state. Therefore, a higher rating quality will be demanded by the investment bank.
The last point of Proposition 1 refers to the cost e¢ ciency of CRAs. If the cost
e¢ ciency of CRAs increases - meaning lower marginal costs per rating for a given
quality - IBs would demand a higher rating quality. From a welfare perspective, the
IBs individual gains from getting a credit rating can be interpreted as the "social
value" of a credit rating, where the rst-best rating quality q maximizes the social
value of a credit rating.
ii. More clients than CRAs: If in the economy are more IBs than CRAs
there is market power on the side of CRAs. In that case, the rating fee, required by
the CRA, increases as follows. In order to maximize its prots from "producing"
a credit rating, the CRA will set the rating fee to the highest possible level. It
optimally sets the rating fee such that it is equal to the informative value of a credit
rating for the rated investment bank in equation (3):
 (q) = q (1  p)m
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Since we assume that credit ratings are not mandatory, the IB is willing to obtain
a credit rating, if the informative value of the rating minus the rating fee is larger
or equal zero. In case ii. the expected additional prot for the IB of getting rated
will be zero. If the IB would set a higher rating fee, the IB would not be willing
to obtain a credit rating. The decision problem of the CRA is now to choose a
rating quality that maximizes its prot - the di¤erence between the fee per rating
and the costs per rating: CRA (q) = q (1  p)m   c (q). Given the fee setting
behavior above, the maximization problem is exactly the same as in case i. (see
equation (4)) and therefore the supplied rst-best rating quality that maximizes
the prots of the CRA is the same (q = q). The only thing that di¤ers, is the
distribution of the prots originating from the credit rating. In case i., only the IB
prots from getting rated, while in case ii., the value of the credit rating is taken
entirely by the CRA. The overall social surplus of a credit rating is the same in both
cases. Therefore, the characteristics of the rst-best rating quality in equilibrium,
as described in proposition 1, applies for the case of market power of CRAs, too. It
has often been a point of criticism in the real world that CRAs have market power
and that the quality of credit ratings would be higher if there were more competition
in the rating sector. As was shown above, the model concludes that market power
in itself is no reason for regulatory intervention if rating quality is observable and
contractible, since the optimal rating quality is the same in the monopoly and the
perfect competition case.
However, the equilibrium rating quality would change, if the rating quality be-
comes unobservable and not contractible. In that case the CRA has an incentive
to lower rating quality after it was assigned to issue a credit rating, because this
would reduce the rating costs and increase the prots. The model does not consider
a repeated game or a reputation mechanism, instead the model concentrates on pos-
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sibilities of regulation in a one period game. Therefore, it is even optimal for the
CRA to set the rating quality equal zero after it was hired for a rating service by
the IB, because this would maximize the prot per credit rating. According to the
rating technology, the CRA would in the case of a rating quality of zero issue inac-
curate good credit ratings and the social value of credit ratings would vanish. The
misallocation of funds therefore increases in the case of unobservable rating quality
and a rationale for regulation emerges in order to preserve the potential social value
of credit ratings. Real world experience - as presented by anecdotal evidence in
the introduction - has shown that the threat of losing reputation alone obviously is
not enough to discipline the CRAs. Partnoy (1999) argues that CRAs "have not
maintained good reputations, based on the informational content of their credit rat-
ings. Instead, credit rating agencies have thrived, proted, and become exceedingly
powerful because they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e. the right to be in
compliance with regulation." The next section analyzes the optimal regulation by
a regulator, which sets a minimum rating standard and the implications for social
welfare.
3.3.3 The Optimal Rating Standard
If rating quality is neither observable nor contractible, the CRA has an incentive
to lower the rating quality. This would decrease the costs per credit rating and
increase the CRAs prots, which again decreases the social value of a credit rating.
In order to preserve the potential social value added of a credit rating, a regulator
can set a minimum rating standard.30 We assume that a regulator has a costly
30The content of minimum rating standards could for example be oversight of CRAs sta¤,
transparency of the rating process or parts of the IOSCO code of conduct fundamentals which
can be summarized in three categories: 1. Quality and integrity of the rating process, 2. CRA
independence and 3. CRA responsibilities to the investing public and issuers. (see IOSCO, 2004)
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technology, which may detect whether a CRA incorporates a rating quality below
a certain minimum rating standard, which is set by the regulator. The detection
technology is designed in such a way that the regulator can detect compliance with
a rating standard with a certain probability h 2 [0; 1], which is an increasing and
concave function of the employed costly e¤ort e: h0 (e) > 0, h00 (e) < 0 and h (0) = 0,
lim
e!1
h (e)  1, lim
e!1
h0 (e) = 0, lim
e!0
h0 (e) =1. If the regulator detects that the rating
quality of a CRA is below the rating standard, the CRA has to pay a penalty .
Since a deviating CRA will not be detected with certainty, it faces an expected
penalty P. The prot of the CRA is now given by the fee per rating minus the costs
per rating minus the expected penalty:
CRA (q) =  (q)  c (q)  P
Lemma 1 describes the expected penalty in case of deviation and compliance with
the rating standard.
Lemma 1 If the regulator sets a rating standard q̂, and if deviation from the stand-
ard is detected with probability h (e), the CRA faces an expected penalty P with
P =

h (e) , if q < q̂
0, if q  q̂ .
Since we assume limited liability of the CRA, the penalty  in case of deviation
from the rating standard and detection by the regulator has an upper limit. This
upper limit can be characterized by the total wealth W of the CRA, accumulated
from past activities plus the rating prots in the actual period in the case of deviation
from the rating standard (i.e. c(q) = 0):   W + .
The sequence of events in the model is summarized in gure 3.2. At rst, nature
determines, whether the portfolio of the IB is good or bad. In the next step, the
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regulator has to decide on the rating standard q̂, the penalty for the CRA in case of
deviation from the standard , and the e¤ort employed in the detection technology
e. Taking the parameters, chosen by the regulator, as given, the IB decides to buy a
Figure 3.2: Sequence of events.
credit rating at quality q̂, if the informational value of the credit rating is larger or
equal zero and pays the rating fee . Then the CRA decides on the rating quality q
and issues a credit rating (r = b or r = g). After the credit rating is published, the
regulator detects deviation from the rating standard with probability h(e) and the
CRA has to pay the penalty  in case of deviation from the standard. Debt nance
d is being provided, conditional on the issued credit rating, and nally, the value of
the portfolio (	g or 	b) materializes.
We assume that the objective of the regulator is to maximize the social value
(V ) of the credit rating. If we take into account that regulation needs costly e¤ort
e, the decision problem of the regulator is to maximize the social value of the credit
rating, given by equation (4), minus the e¤ort costs of regulation e, by deciding on
the rating standard q, the detection e¤ort e and the penalty :
max
q̂;e;
V (q̂) = q (1  p)m  c (q)  e (6)
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The incentive compatibility constraint that induces the CRA to comply with the
rating standard is given by:
 (q̂)  c (q̂)  P (q  q̂)   (q̂)  c (q)  P (q < q̂) (7)
The incentive compatibility constraint states that the expected prot of the CRA in
case of compliance with the rating standard net of rating costs and expected penalty
must be larger or equal the expected prot in case of deviation from the standard
net of the expected penalty. Since in the case of deviation the CRA chooses the
lowest rating quality q = 0 in order to minimize costs (c (0) = 0), and since the
optimal policy of the regulator requires the incentive compatibility constraint to be
binding, equation (7) can be rewritten, using lemma 1, as:
c (q̂) = h (e)  (8)
The rating costs c are increasing and convex in q 2 [0; 1] and the probability that
regulation will detect deviation from the rating standard h (e), which could be con-
sidered as the e¢ ciency of regulation, is monotonous increasing and concave in the
employed e¤ort e as we have dened above. Therefore, the function h (e) can be
inverted and equation (8) be solved for the optimal regulatory e¤ort, depending on
the quality standard q̂, and be rewritten as:
e (q̂) = h 1

c (q̂)


(9)
This function reveals the optimal regulation e¤ort for a given quality standard, such
that the quality standard is implementable, meaning that the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding. For a given penalty and due to the assumed characteristics
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of the cost function c(q), the optimal e¤ort, which is employed in regulation, is
increasing and convex in the rating standard q̂. The intuition of this equation is
straightforward. If the rating standard increases, the costs of rating increase, too.
Therefore, the incentive for a CRA to deviate from the standard (i.e. setting the
rating quality equal zero) increases. In order to make the higher standard incentive
compatible, the expected penalty must increase. For a given penalty , the regulator
has to increase e¤ort e to implement the more demanding rating standard q̂. We
have mentioned above that due to limited liability, the penalty, the CRA has to
pay in case of deviation from the standard is limited by the wealth, accumulated
in the past plus the prots of rating in the actual period. Furthermore, equation
(6) shows that e¤ort, employed in regulation, reduces social welfare. In order to set
the expected penalty such that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, it
is optimal from a welfare perspective, to set the penalty in case of deviation to its
highest possible level: ̂ = W + . A lower penalty would require the regulator to
employ more e¤ort to keep h (e)  constant, which would reduce social value.
The maximization problem of the regulator in equation (6) can now be reduced
to the optimal choice of the rating standard. The optimal penalty is given by ̂ and
the optimal e¤ort e is the optimal response to q according to equation (9). Inserting
equation (9) in equation (6) leads to:
max
q̂
V̂ (q̂) = q̂ (1  p)m  c (q̂)  e (q̂)
Because rating costs and e¤ort costs are convex in the rating quality, the objective
function leads to an interior solution. The rst-order condition is given by:
(1  p)m = c0 (q̂) + e0 (q̂) ;
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which leads to the optimal rating standard that maximizes social welfare, under the
assumption that rating quality is unobservable. In part 3.3.2 we have shown that
the rst-best rating quality in the case of observable and contractible rating quality
was given by (1  p)m = c0 (q). A comparison with the optimal rating standard
under regulation shows that q̂ < q. The intuition is straightforward. Monitoring of
a certain rating standard is costly, which reduces social welfare. Therefore a lower
rating standard compared to the rst-best will be implemented by the regulator. The
inuence of the exogenous parameters is analog to proposition 1 and are summarized
in proposition 2 point (i) to (iii). Additionally, the optimal rating standard is
increasing in the e¢ ciency of regulation (i.e. the optimal rating standard is higher,
if the marginal e¤ort costs of increasing the standard are lower).
Proposition 2 A regulator, who maximizes social welfare, chooses a rating stand-
ard q̂ which is lower than the rst-best rating standard q. The optimal rating stand-
ard q̂ becomes
(i) smaller, if the unconditional probability of the IBs portfolio being in a good
state p increases.
(ii) larger, if the size of the potential misallocation of investment m without
increases.
(iii) larger, if the cost e¢ ciency of the CRA and the regulator increases.
(iv) The optimal rating standard q̂ is higher, if the wealth of the CRA increases.
Part (iv) of proposition 2 implicitly points to the di¤erence in the optimal rating
standard in the case, where CRAs make zero prots, i.e. "perfect competition" on
the CRA market, and the case, where CRAs takes the informational value of rating,
i.e. the "market power case" (see for these two cases part 3.3.2). In the market power
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case (m), the wealth of the CRA that can be penalized by the regulator may be
assumed to be larger than the wealth in the perfect competition case (c). Therefore,
the optimal penalty, which is set by the regulator, would have the following property:
̂m > ̂c. The modied incentive compatibility constraint (9) shows that the optimal
regulatory e¤ort for a given rating standard is decreasing as the optimal penalty
increases. Therefore, enforcement of regulation becomes more e¢ cient, if the CRA
has "more to lose", since less costly e¤ort has to be employed to enforce a given
rating standard. From this follows that costly regulatory e¤ort has a less negative
impact on social welfare. The optimal rating standard increases, if the representative
CRA has more to lose, i.e. if the CRA has a higher "charter value". The model
shows again that from this perspective, market power of some few CRAs is not in
itself a rationale for regulatory intervention. In the rst-best case, where rating
quality is assumed to be observable and contractible, the optimal rating quality and
social value of ratings is independent of the structure of the CRA market. In the
case of unobservable rating quality, the model shows that a higher charter value of
CRAs moves the optimal rating standard and social value of credit ratings closer to
the rst-best result.31
31However, even if this is true in the framework used here, this nding should be read with
caution with regards to generalization. The only consequence of market power in the model is that
the surplus of credit ratings is reallocated from the IB to the CRA, the overall surplus remains
unchanged. The model does not take into account potential adverse e¤ects of CRA market power
with consequences on the level of the rating fee and the overall social value of credit ratings.
Ine¢ cient high rating fees might for example induce the debt issuer to engage in riskier portfolios,
which may decrease nancial market stability (see chapter 4).
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3.4 Conicts of Interest and Optimal Regulation
So far, the unobservability of rating qualities was considered as the only rationale for
the regulation of CRAs. What has not yet been included in the model are potential
adverse e¤ects of conicts of interest between the CRA and the rated rm (in our
framework the rated IB). One potential source of conicts of interest is the fact
that credit ratings usually are paid by the issuer of a debt instrument and not by
the investors. Facing the fact that since the early 197032 CRAs mainly are paid by
their clients33, the client could in principle directly bribe the CRA in exchange for
a better credit rating. Another potential conict of interest emerged in the special
role of CRAs in the rise of structured nance products during the last years. While
interaction between the issuer of a traditional debt security and the CRA was rather
limited, the case is di¤erent in the rating of structured nance transactions. In the
rating process of those structured nance products, CRAs are involved in an iterative
process with the issuer. The structuring process of these products includes implicit
structuring advice by the CRAs, meaning that the CRA indicates what needs to be
done to receive the desired credit rating.34 Broadly speaking, CRAs not only o¤er
the service of the pure rating, but also o¤er additional consulting services. This
deeper involvement of CRAs has been heavily criticized in the public, especially
in association with the crisis in the subprime loan market. This problematic is
also captured to some degree in the U.S. "Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006",
32For an overview on the history of credit rating agencies see for example Hill (2004) or Can-
tor&Packer (1995).
33An argument for this payment scheme is the emergence of information technology during the
last 30 years, which gave information, once it is originated a public good character (a single investor
would only be willing to pay for a rating if it is not made public). Another argument is that it is
more e¢ cient to let the issuer pay instead of each single investor of a large and dispersed investor
community, that uses the credit rating for its investment decision. (see White, 2001)
34For a summary of the role of CRAs in structured ncance products see Rosner and Mason
(2007) and BIS (2005). According to BIS (2005) "[...] it has become common for rating agencies
to o¤er special services relating to rmsbond ratings [...] that could impact rating levels. These
services may be separately rewarded and may thus exacerbate any potential conicts of interst
arising from issuer fees."
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which among others "directs the SEC to issue nal rules to prohibit unfair, coercive,
or abusive acts or practices by NRSROs35 [...] such as conditioning or threatening
to condition an issuers credit rating on the purchase of other services or products"
(see CRA Reform Act, 2006). Based on Pagano & Immordino (2007) for the case of
auditing rms, we extend in the following section the model by allowing the CRA to
o¤er additionally consulting services to the rated investment bank (IB). We assume
that the portfolio, for which the IB seeks debt nance from external investors, is
managed by a portfolio-manager, whos salary partly consists of a payment which
is proportionally to the volume of managed portfolios. Hence, the manager has an
interest that the IB receives nancing by external investors with certainty, since
this would increase his salary. As we have shown above, external investors only
nance a portfolio, if it receives a good credit rating (r = g), therefore the portfolio-
manager has an incentive to engage in activities to ensure a high credit rating for
the portfolio.36 One possibility to achieve that goal would be a direct bribe to the
CRA in exchange for a higher credit rating. Another way of modelling conicts of
interest in our model arises from the joint provision of credit ratings and consulting
services by a single CRA, from which emerges a more sophisticated possibility of
collusion between the CRA and the rated IB as follows. Since the CRA is very well
informed about its client in the course of the rating process, we assume that the
CRA has the expertise to o¤er consulting services to the IB at lower costs compared
with competitors due to economies of scope. The possibility of collusion now arises,
if the IB is only willing to pay for an additional consulting contract, if in exchange
the CRA issues a good credit rating. Since we assume that the CRA can provide
35NRSRO = nationally recognized statistical rating organization; a CRA has to be recognized
by the SEC (securities and exchange commission), in order to be used for regulatory purposes. The
"Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006" includes the simplication of the recognition process.
36Note, that we assume that the IB decides to get rated only, if the informational value of a
credit rating is larger or equal zero (see section 3.1).
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such services at lower costs, the received market fee for the consulting service can be
regarded as a rent for the CRA. The conict of interest is clear: the consulting fee
acts as a bribe, and the CRA only gets the fee in exchange for a good credit rating.
Section 3.4.1 extends the model and analyzes consequences for the optimal rating
standard which is set by the regulator. In section 3.4.2, we analyze, if forbidding the
joint provision of rating and consulting services is optimal from a welfare perspective.
3.4.1 Optimal Rating Standard in the Presence of Conicts of Interest
The analysis is now extended by assuming that the IB employs a portfolio-manager,
whose salary consists of a proportion  2 [0; 1] of the portfolio value. After de-
ducting the rating fee and repayment of debt to external investors, the net prot
of the IB after the true value of the portfolio materialized with consideration of
the management compensation, is given by: ~	      d   ~	. According to the
compensation scheme, the manager has an interest that investment takes place with
certainty, which is the case without a credit rating and with a "good" credit rating
r = g. Therefore, the manager - if he is opportunistic - has an incentive to induce
the CRA to issue a good credit rating. The manager - who requires the CRA to issue
a good credit rating in exchange - may either bribe the CRA directly by o¤ering a
bribe  > 0 or indirectly by engaging the CRA for rating and additional consulting
services. In the following it will be shown that both forms of corruption have similar
implications regarding the optimal rating standard. The CRA is assumed to be able
to o¤er consulting services additionally to the rating service. Due to economies of
scope, the CRA is assumed to o¤er the same consulting service as an external com-
petitor (Comp:) at lower costs : CRA < Comp:.
37 Under the assumption of perfect
37From performing the rating procedure, we assume that the CRA has gained expertise to o¤er
additional consulting at lower costs, compared to a third competitior.
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competition in the consulting sector, the market consulting fee ' is equal to the
consulting costs: ' = Comp:. If the CRA, instead of an external rm, gets employed
for performing the consulting service, the CRA receives the market consulting fee '
and therefore earns a rent   '   CRA > 0. At the same time, making use of
the CRAs economies of scope, the rent  increases social welfare, due to e¢ ciency
gains.
Given those assumptions, the portfolio-manager has an incentive to o¤er a con-
sulting contract, contingent on a good credit rating. If the CRA accepts this o¤er,
the prots of the CRA from rating and consulting are given as follows:
CRA (q) =  (q)  c (q) + '  CRA   P (10)
The requirement for getting o¤ered the contract for the joint provision of credit
rating and consulting is that the CRA issues a good credit rating. Therefore, it is
optimal for the CRA to set q = 0, since that minimizes the costs (i.e. c (0) = 0).
Using   '   CRA > 0 and considering the expected penalty in the case of
deviation from the rating standard h (e) ̂, equation (10) can be rewritten as:
CRA (q) =  (q) +   h (e) ̂ (10)
Now it is obvious that the additional rent for the consulting service acts as a bribe.
The bribe makes sure that the IB receives a good credit rating and that nancing
by external investors happens for sure. Therefore, the portfolio-manager gets the
partial salary ~	 with certainty. In the case of a direct bribe , the prot equation
can be formulated analogously by replacing  with . While the consequences
of corruption regarding the social value are clear in the case of the direct bribe,
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they are twofold in the case of joint provision of services. In both cases the IB
receives a good credit rating and the IBs portfolio receives even then nancing, if
the portfolio would have received a bad credit rating without the bribe. Henceforth,
the misallocation of funds increases, which reduces the social value of a credit rating.
An additional positive impact on the social value occurs with the joint provision of
services, because the CRA is assumed to o¤er consulting services more e¢ ciently in
terms of costs compared to a third party. Therefore, the social value increases by
 in that case. We assume that the possibility of collusion cannot be prevented
by the external investors, since the large investors community is assumed to have
a collective action problem.38 Taking into account the opposed e¤ects of the joint
provision of services by a single CRA and the possibility of collusion, the decision
problem of the regulator, who maximizes the social value of rating, is given by39:
max
~q;e
~V (~q) = ~q (1  p)m+  c (~q)  e (11)
The rating standard in the presence of possible collusion is denoted by ~q. The
new incentive compatibility constraint requires the CRAs prot from rating and
compliance with the rating standard, set by the regulator, to be larger or equal the
CRAs prot in the case of joint provision of services and acceptance of the bribe,
given by equation (10):
 (~q)  c (~q)   (~q) +   h (e) ̂
In the case of a direct bribe,  in the incentive compatibility constraint has to
38If any collective action restrictions would be absent, investors could make the debt nancing
dependend on the requirement, that consulting and rating by the same rm is impossible.
39The e¢ ciency gain is integrated into the social value function in the most easiest way by simply
adding . In the case of a direct bribe  the positive e¤ect on social welfare would be absent and
the objective function of the regulator is the same as equation (5) in section 3.3.
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be replaced by . The optimal rating standard has to be chosen such that it is
implementable by the CRA and collusion does not happen. According to section
3.3, the incentive compatibility constraint can be reformulated as the optimal e¤ort,
employed in regulation, as a function of the optimal rating standard, which assures
the constraint being binding:
e (~q) = h 1

c (~q) + 
̂

(12)
As equation (9) in section 3.3.3, the optimal e¤ort is increasing and convex in the
rating standard. But in contrast to equation (9), the optimal e¤ort, given a certain
rating standard is now higher, since the numerator increases by  in equation
(12).40 In that case, more costly e¤ort has to be employed by the regulator to make
a given rating standard incentive compatible. Using equation (12) in equation (11),
maximizing with respect to ~q leads to the following rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q)
Proposition 3 describes the properties of the new optimal rating standard:
Proposition 3 If the rent from the joint provision of services is  > 0 or if
there is the possibility of a direct bribe  > 0, the optimal rating standard in the
presence of potential collusion between CRA and IB is lower than the optimal rating
standard without the possibility of collusion: ~q < q̂. The optimal rating standard
is decreasing, if the rent of the joint provision of services  or the direct bribe 
increase.
40Analogously, in the case of a direct bribe the optimal e¤ort, which assures the incentive com-
patibility constraint being binding, can be rewritten as: e (~q) = h 1

c(~q)+
̂

.
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If there were no e¢ ciency gains from the joint provision of services, the bribe
would be zero:  = 0. In that case the optimal rating standard is the same as in
section 3.3., where rating service only is considered: ~q = q̂. Accordingly, the optimal
rating standard is the same (~q = q̂), if the regulator would forbid the joint provision
of services by the CRA or the possibility of a direct bribe, since the possibility of
collusion would then be eliminated. The intuition of why ~q < q̂ is straightforward, if
 > 0 or  > 0. The corresponding e¤ort that has to be employed by the regulator
for a given rating standard is now higher as shown in equation (12). Since an increase
of costly regulatory e¤ort decreases the social value, the regulator chooses a lower
rating standard. If the rent  or the direct bribe  increase, also the incentive
for the CRA to accept the bribe and collude with the IB increases. Therefore it
is optimal for the regulator to set a lower rating standard, since that would reduce
the CRAs cost in the case of compliance with the standard. In principle, one of
the two sources of potential collusion can be prevented by the regulator by simply
forbidding the joint provision of rating and consulting services. That issue has
also been discussed by the SEC and the European Commission in reaction to the
inglorious role of CRAs in the subprime loan crisis in 2007 and been addressed in
the "Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006" in the US. While collusion through
the joint provision of services cannot be presumed ex ante by the regulator, the
intention for corruption is obvious for the case of a direct bribe. For the remainder
of the paper is assumed that direct bribes, for example in the form of extra payments
or rating fees above the market level, would easily be detectable by the regulator
and the analysis concentrates on the more sophisticated form of collusion - namely
conicts of interest via the joint provision of services. Whether the joint provision
of services should be prohibited by regulation from a welfare perspective, will be
analyzed in the next section.
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3.4.2 Regulatory Intervention and Social Value
The model showed that the consulting fee can be used by the client to bribe the
CRA to issue an inaccurate higher credit rating, if a CRA o¤ers both ratings and
consulting services. As already mentioned above, the role of CRAs in the past years
changed from a passive to a more active part particularly in the rating process of
structured debt products, such as collateralized debt obligations. In an iterative pro-
cess, CRAs are involved in advising their clients in designing products that receive
the desired high credit rating to be attractive for the investors community. CRAs
have been heavily criticized for this behavior in the recent past, as they were under
suspicion of being exposed to conicts of interest, therefore being jointly respons-
ible for the nancial market crisis in 2007 by issuing inaccurate credit ratings. The
models answer to a situation with existing conicts of interest is that the regulator
should either simply choose a lower rating standard or forbid the joint provision of
services and eliminate the potential conict of interest at its root. In the latter case
the regulator chooses optimally a higher rating standard, as shown in the previous
section. But what has not been analyzed so far, is the question, whether the regu-
lator should allow of forbid the joint provision of services, if the decision criterion is
the social value.41 The objective function of the regulator in the presence of conicts
of interest was given by:
max
~q
~V (~q) = ~q (1  p)m+  c (~q)  h 1

c (~q) + 
̂

(13)
As we have shown above, the CRA - if it is hired for creating a credit rating - can
provide consulting services more e¢ ciently in comparison to external competitors
41In the case of a direct bribe () without joint provision of services, the implication for regulation
is very easy: "forbidding" to accept the direct bribe increases the social value of rating, because
there is no potential e¢ ciency gain and no trade-o¤ from allowing the possibility of collusion in
that case.
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by being able to provide the same service at lower costs. This e¢ ciency gain ,
that can be used by the rated IB to bribe the CRA, on the one hand increases the
social value. This positive e¤ect would be lost, if the regulator would forbid the
joint provision of services. On the other hand, the joint provision of services makes
collusion possible and the nancing of bad portfolios more likely, which decreases
the social value. As the e¢ ciency gain has one negative and one positive e¤ect
on the social value, the answer is now, under which circumstances the regulator
optimally should allow or forbid the joint provision of activities. If the regulator
forbids the bundling of services, the social welfare of the credit rating is V̂ (q̂), as
dened in section 3.3.3. In the following, we compare the social value in the case of
joint provision of services (case 1: ~V (~q)), with the social value, if CRAs are allowed
to o¤er ratings only (case 2: V̂ (q̂))42. The partial e¤ect of an increase of  on the
social value in case 2 is zero (@V̂ =@ = 0), while in case 1 is given by
@ ~V
@
= 1  h 10 (:::) 1
̂
(14)
Depending on the size of equation (14), i.e. whether 1 ? h 10 (:::) 1
̂
, the social value
can either increase or decrease as  increases. Therefore, obviously one criterion
for the regulators decision is the size of , as the e¤ect on the social value could
be positive or negative for di¤ering values. The previous section has shown that
the necessary e¤ort for a given rating quality increases as  becomes larger. From
this follows that h 10 (:::) in equation (14) is a positive and increasing function of
. If equation (14) is negative at  = 0, it remains negative for any  > 0. In
that case, despite of the e¢ ciency gain, it is optimal for the regulator to prohibit
the joint provision of services, because ~V < V̂ for all  > 0. If equation (14) is
42The objective function if the CRA o¤ers the service of rating only was given by V̂ (q̂) =
q̂ (1  p)m  c (q̂)  h 1

c(q̂)
̂

(see section 3.3).
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positive at  = 0, it becomes negative, if  becomes su¢ ciently large. In that
case, there exists a threshold value for the size of  = , below which it is
optimal for the regulator to allow the joint provision of services (case 1), since the
positive e¤ects on the social value overweigh (~V  V̂ for 0    ). On the
other side for  >  it is optimal to forbid the joint provision of ratings and
consulting services, since the adverse e¤ects of conicts of interest dominate (~V < V̂
for > ). To analyze the determinants for the decision of the regulator, besides
the size of the e¢ ciency gain (which works in our model as a bribe) further, equation
(14) can be rewritten as follows43:
@ ~V
@
=
1
c0 (~q)
(c0 (~q)  e0 (~q)) (15)
Equation (15) is negative for any positive value of , if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0.
While c0 (~q) can be interpreted as the marginal costs of rating, and therefore as the
cost e¢ ciency of CRAs, e0 (~q) can be interpreted as the e¢ ciency of the regulation
technology. Above, the regulation technology was characterized by the probability
to detect deviation from a certain rating standard by employing costly e¤ort e. A
more e¢ cient regulation technology would require less e¤ort to enforce a given rating
standard and henceforth a lower increase of e¤ort if the rating standard increases
(e0high (~q) < e
0
low (~q)). If the e¢ ciency of the rating technology is su¢ ciently low,
such that c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, it is optimal for the regulator to forbid the
joint provision of services for any positive value of , since the social value in
case of the joint provision of services is always smaller, compared to case 2 (~V (~q) <
V̂ (q̂)). Proposition 4 describes the optimal decision of the regulator, if the regulation
technology is too ine¢ cient.
43The derivation of this equation is in the appendix 3.C.
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Proposition 4 If the regulation technology is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, such that
c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, the optimal strategy for the regulator is to forbid the
joint provision of services and to set the optimal rating standard q = q̂. Otherwise
the social value of rating would be ine¢ ciently low for any  > 0: ~V (~q) < V̂ (q̂).
While the decision between case 1 and case 2 is clear and independent of the
size of , if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q) at  = 0, the decision problem looks di¤erent, if the
e¢ ciency of the regulation technology is su¢ ciently high. If the regulation techno-
logy is such that c0 (~q) > e0 (~q) at  = 0, equation (15) is positive as  increases
and becomes negative, if  becomes su¢ ciently large. This is true, because c0 (~q)
becomes smaller and e0 (~q) becomes larger as  increases.44 From this follows that
for c0 (~q) > e0 (~q) at  = 0 the optimal decision of the regulator for one of the two
alternatives depends on the size of the e¢ ciency gain . Proposition 5 describes
the optimal decision of the regulator.
Proposition 5 If the regulation technology is su¢ ciently e¢ cient such that c0 (q̂) >
e0 (q̂) at  = 0, and the size of the e¢ ciency gain is below its critical value,  <
, the optimal strategy for the regulator is to allow the joint provision of services
and to set the optimal rating standard ~q < q̂, since ~V (~q) > V̂ (q̂) for  < . If
the e¢ ciency gain is larger than its critical value,  > , the optimal strategy
is to forbid the joint provision of services and to set the optimal rating standard q̂,
since ~V (~q) < V̂ (q̂) for  > .
The model shows that the joint provision of services - for example expressed by
the deep involvement of CRAs in the rating process of structured nance products,
such as collateralized debt obligations - is not necessarily a root of ine¢ ciency for
44Proposition 3 in the previous section has shown that @~q@ < 0. Because of the convexity of c(:)
follows that @c
0(:)
@ < 0. For the derivation of
@e0(:)
@ , see the proof of proposition 4 in the appendix.
50
3. THE OPTIMAL REGULATION OF CRAS
which regulatory intervention could be justied. If the criterion for the regulator
is social welfare, the decision of the regulator on the optimal rating standard and
possible restrictions of activities depends on the surrounding conditions. If the
potential bribe is large enough, it is optimal to restrict the activities of CRAs, as
the negative e¤ects of collusion dominate. But it could be optimal to allow the
joint provision of services, if the bribe is low enough, since the positive e¤ects of
the e¢ ciency gain dominate in that case. Additionally, the model shows that the
basic requirement for the strategy of allowing the joint provision of services lies in
the hand of the regulator, meaning that the e¢ ciency of the regulation technology
has to be su¢ ciently high.
3.5 Conclusion
The discussion on the role and power of CRAs in nancial markets is an ongoing
debate among academics, practitioners, and institutions of nancial supervision.45
Many times, CRAs were suspected for having issued inaccurate credit ratings or
having updated already issued credit ratings too late. Furthermore, CRAs were
suspected to be exposed to various conicts of interest. Jochen Sanio, the chairman
of the German federal nancial supervision authority (Ban), once blamed CRAs
to be the "largest uncontrolled power in the global nancial system".46 On the role
of CRAs in the subprime loan crisis, Keneth Rogo¤ presumed that ""[...] rating
agencies cooperated too closely with the banks and received a much too high pay-
ment for their ratings." and "I could imagine that Moodys will become the Arthur
Andersen of this decade"(see Zeit, 2007).
45See for example IOSCO (2004, 2007) and CRA Reform Act (2006).
46Own translation from German to English. This quote is from a public hearing of the nancial
committe of the German Bundestag at June 4th 2003.
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The applied model in chapter 3, which is based on Pagano & Immordino (2007),
has shown that intransparency of how credit ratings are generated by CRAs, could be
a rationale for regulation. Without regulation, the quality of the credit ratings would
be ine¢ ciently low and misallocation of investment ine¢ ciently high. Minimum
rating standards, which can be enforced by costly regulation, would increase the
social value of credit ratings in the applied model. The adverse e¤ects of conicts
of interest were analyzed in the model, too. By the joint provision of credit ratings
and consulting services, we have shown that on the one hand there is the threat of
collusion, which may lead to inaccurate credit ratings, but on the other hand that
potential e¢ ciency gains are present, too. In the presented theory, the potential
conict of interest can be prevented by simply constraining the activities of CRAs.
It has also been discussed that this regulatory intervention may or may not be
optimal from a welfare perspective.
The results of that paper on the one hand gives a contribution to the theoretical
academic literature on CRAs, by modelling the optimal regulation of CRAs in the
presence of unobservable rating quality and conicts of interest. On the other hand,
the analysis, presented in this paper, also contributes to the discussion about the
possibility and necessity to regulate activities of CRAs that is consistently present
among institutions of nancial market regulation as well as observers and practi-
tioners of nancial markets, especially in the aftermath of the subprime loan crisis
in 2007. A frequent argument against regulation of CRAs in the past was that
CRAs have a strong incentive to issue accurate credit ratings, because otherwise
they would lose their reputation, which is regarded to be the most important asset
of CRAs.47 Therefore it was argued that self-regulation among CRAs works well
and no further regulation would be necessary.
47see for example Schwarcz (2001).
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However, a necessary requirement for self-regulation is competition and the pos-
sibility of market entry for competitors. Due to the market power of some few
CRAs and the heavy criticism, CRAs were confronted with in the past, it is disput-
able whether the threat of losing reputation is enough to prevent CRAs from issuing
inaccurate credit ratings and colluding with debt issuers. Regarding this limited
competition, Partnoy (1999) argues that markets may become inattentive as to the
CRAsreputation as soon as some few CRAs have received recognition status by the
regulator. As soon as self-regulation of CRAs fails, the results of our paper provide
insights for the optimal regulation of CRAs.
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3.A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of proposition 1. The optimal rating quality q 2 [0; 1] is derived by the
rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (q) (A1.)
E¤ect of p: As p increases, the left hand side of A1. becomes smaller. To keep
equality, the right hand side has to become smaller, too. Due to the characteristics
of the cost function c(:), the optimal rating quality q has to decrease.
E¤ect of m: m increases, if d increases and/or 	b decreases. The left hand side
increases, therefore the optimal rating quality q has to increase, too.
E¤ect of c0 (q): A more e¢ cient rating technology is expressed with lower costs
for a given rating standard. If rating quality increases, the rise of costs is lower for a
more e¢ cient technology: c0high (q) < c
0
low (q). The marginal rating costs for a given
rating quality is lower, if cost e¢ ciency becomes higher. The value of left hand side
is exogenous and constant. If cost e¢ ciency increases q, the rating standard has to
rise in order to keep the right hand side constant.
Proof of proposition 2. The optimal rating standard if rating quality q̂ is un-
observable and with costly regulation is derived by the rst order condition:
(1  p)m = c0 (q̂) + e0 (q̂) (A2.)
As the left hand side of (A2.) is the same as the left hand side of (A1.), we have:
c0 (q) = c0 (q̂) + e0 (q̂) (A.2)
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Since c(:) and e(:) are increasing and convex in q, therefore q has to be larger than
q̂: q > q̂.
For the proof of parts (i) to (iii) of proposition 2 see the proof of proposition
1. Part (iv) claims that the optimal rating standard is higher, if optimal penalty ̂
increases. An example for a rise in ̂ is an increase in the prots per rating due to
market power in the CRA sector. The necessary e¤ort that has to be employed in
order to enforce a given rating standard, is given by:
e (q̂) = h 1

c (q̂)
̂

(A3.)
If ̂ increases, the optimal e¤ort corresponding to a given rating standard decreases.
From this follows that the marginal e¤ort e0(:) decreases either. The right hand side
therefore becomes smaller for a given rating standard. Due to the characteristics of
the functions c(:) and e(:), the optimal rating standard q̂ must increase to ensure
equality of equation (A.3).
Proof of proposition 3. Why the optimal rating standard in the presence of
joint provision of services (~q) and analogously in the case of a direct bribe, is lower
than the optimal rating standard in 3.3 (q̂), can be shown as follows: The rst-order
condition of the regulators decision problem is given by
(1  p)m = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q) (A.4)
The left hand side of A4. the same as in equation A.2, therefore it must be true
that:
c0 (q̂) + e0 (q̂) = c0 (~q) + e0 (~q) (A.4)
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Since the e¤ects are analog for the direct () and the indirect bribe (), the proof
is presented for  > 0 only. Taking into account the potential bribe , the
necessary e¤ort to enforce a given rating standard q is larger in the case of joint
provision of services:
e (q) = h 1

c (q)
̂

< e (q) = h 1

c (q) + 
̂

The marginal e¤ort with bribe is therefore larger than the marginal e¤ort without
bribe for a given rating quality. Therefore the optimal rating standard has to be
lower in the case of joint provision of services, to ensure equality of equation (A.4),
given the characteristics of c(:) and e(:): ~q < q̂.
That the optimal rating standard is decreasing as the rent of the joint provision
of services increases can be shown by total di¤erentiating equation (A.4) and using
e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
̂

c0(~q)
̂
:
d (1  p)m| {z }
=0
= c00 (~q) d~q + e00 (~q) d~q + h00 1

c (~q) + 
̂

c0 (~q)
̂2
d
 ! d~q
d
=  
h00 1

c(~q)+
̂

c0(~q)
̂2
c00 (~q) + e00 (~q)
< 0 (A.5)
Equation is smaller than zero, because of the convexity of e(:), c(:), and h 1(). 
Proof of proposition 4. The social value with joint provision of services is given
by ~V , whereas the social value with rating only is given by V̂ . If = 0, then ~V = V̂ .
Equation (A.5) showed that d~q
d
< 0. Therefore, given the characteristics of c(:), it
must be true that @c
0(~q)
@
< 0. Above, we have shown that e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
̂

c0(~q)
̂
.
Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields @e
0(~q)
@
= h00 1

c(~q)+
̂

c0(~q)
̂2
> 0. The
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partial derivative of the social value ~V and V̂ with respect to  is given by: @ ~V
@
=
1
c0(~q) (c
0 (~q)  e0 (~q)) and @V̂
@
= 0. As  increases, the di¤erence (c0 (~q)  e0 (~q))
decreases, since c0 decreases and e0 increases. If @ ~V
@
< 0 at  = 0, which is the
case if c0 (~q) < e0 (~q), the social value ~V decreases further as  increases. Therefore,
it is optimal to prevent the joint provision of services for any  > 0, since ~V < V̂ .

Proof of proposition 5. If @ ~V
@
> 0 at  = 0, then we must have c0 (~q) > e0 (~q).
From this follows that ~V increases, if  becomes larger, as long as  is relatively
small. Given the characteristics of @c
0(~q)
@
and @e
0(~q)
@
, ~V decreases, for relatively large
values of. Therefore, at some critical level = , we have ~V = V̂ . For values
 < , we have ~V > V̂ , and therefore allowing the joint provision of services is
optimal. For values  > , we have ~V < V̂ , and therefore forbidding the joint
provision of services is optimal.
3.B Derivation of Equation (15)
The necessary regulation e¤ort for a given rating standard is given by: e (~q) =
h 1

c(~q)+
̂

. Di¤erentiating with respect to ~q leads to e0 (~q) = h0 1

c(~q)+
̂

c0(~q)
̂
and after rearranging:
e0 (~q)
c0 (~q)
= h0 1

c (~q) + 
̂

1
̂
(A.6)
Inserting equation (A.6) into equation (14): @ ~V
@
= 1   h0 1

c(~q)+
̂

1
̂
leads to
equation (15):
@ ~V
@
= 1  e
0 (~q)
c0 (~q)
 ! @
~V
@
=
1
c0 (~q)
(c0 (~q)  e0 (~q))
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4 Credit Rating Agencies and Financial Market
Stability
4.1 Introduction
Credit ratings, which are published by credit rating agencies (CRAs), reect the
opinion of the CRA on the likelihood that an issuer of a debt instrument will default
on the interest or principal due on its bonds. Whether a rm or a debt instrument
is rated investment-grade or speculative-grade, inuences the conditions at which
the issuer of a debt instrument can borrow. With increasing complexity of nancial
markets, the reliance of both investors and regulators on credit ratings has grown
rapidly in the last decades. Nevertheless, the role, CRAs play in nancial markets, is
not unambiguous. On the one hand, in consideration of the fact that the amount of
rated debt instruments increased dramatically over the last decades, credit ratings
seem to be very important and valuable for nancial markets. Therefore, CRAs
seem to have enormous market inuence and informative value, because otherwise
there would be no need for debt issuers to spend money for costly credit ratings. On
the other hand, CRAs faced heavy criticism in the recent past for issuing inaccurate
credit ratings and for not revealing additional important information. Examples for
presumably inaccurate behavior of CRAs are the defaults of Enron or Parmalat and
the Asian crisis.48 Another example is the dubious role of CRAs in relationship with
the nancial market crisis in 2007, set o¤ by the debacle in subprime lending in the
USA. CRAs rated structured nancial products with the highest rating, which were
worth less than junk bonds after the start of the crisis. A closer look at the market
48In the latter case, the CRAs gave Thailand an investment-grade rating until ve months after
the start of the crisis. In the case of Enron, CRAs adhered an investment-grade rating until days
before the rm went bankrupt.
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structure of CRAs shows that the market is dominated by three big global rms
(Moodys Investors Services, Standard & Poors and Fitch Ratings). Those three
CRAs together have a market share of 96%, whereat Standard & Poors (40%)
and Moodys (39%) are about equal in size. It has been criticized several times
that there is obviously a lack of competition and limited market entry. That there
is obviously not much price competition49 among the two largest CRAs shows a
look at their quasi-monopoly prots.50 While CRAs themselves remained largely
unregulated, credit ratings are extensively used in nancial market regulation. For
examples, many institutional investors are restricted to invest only in instruments
with a certain credit rating and in the context of Basel II, capital adequacy ratios
are determined according to the rating of a debtor.51
The main goal of that paper is to analyze the role of CRAs and credit ratings
in the context of nancial market stability. Three questions will be analyzed in a
theoretical framework. The rst question is, in how far the valuable role of credit
ratings is inuenced by the size of the rating fee. By analyzing that question, the
paper emphasizes the role of market power of some few CRAs, which obviously
have the possibility to set higher rating fees compared to the competitive level. The
second question is, in how far the valuable role of credit ratings is inuenced, if credit
ratings are voluntary instead of mandatory. The third questions asks, whether the
way CRAs exactly generate their revenues - charging the rating fee from debt issuers
or investors - has consequences for the stabilizing role of credit ratings.
The theoretical framework in this paper is an extension of the approach in Boot
49See Economist (2005).
50The operating margin of Moodys in 2006 was 61.8% and in 2005 54.3%. The operating margin
of Standard & Poors in 2006 was 43% and 42.5%. See Moodys (2007) and Standard & Poors
(2007).
51For an overview about the use of credit ratings in nancial market regulation, see for example
BIS (2000) or Rosenbaum (2004).
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et al. (2006). The valuable and stabilizing role of credit ratings is motivated as a
solution in situations, where multiple equilibria exist. Therefore, the use of credit
ratings may increase stability in nancial markets. It is assumed that an investment
bank has the possibility to invest in a portfolio with either high or low risk. In order
to nance its operations, the investment bank issues a debt contract and o¤ers it
to external investors. It will be shown that under certain conditions, the decision
of the investment bank depends on the expectations of external investors - and
will thus become self-fullling. In those cases, multiple equilibria are present and
the desired good equilibrium may be established by the use of credit ratings. The
coordination mechanism relies on one important regulatory feature: a part of the
investor community - institutional investors - is restricted to invest only in products
with a certain credit rating.
By introducing rating fees it will come clear that the ability of credit ratings to
improve nancial market stability depends on the size of the rating fee. A reduction
of the rating fee always improves the utility of credit ratings, irrespective whether
investors or the rated issuer has to pay for the rating service. With the inclusion of
rating fees, we directly take a stand on the debate whether the obvious limited com-
petition in the market of CRAs, which presumably leads to ine¢ ciently high rating
fees, has negative e¤ects on nancial market stability. The model concludes that in
the presence of ine¢ ciently high rating fees credit ratings may be more valuable, if
it is mandatory to request a credit rating. It may also have an impact on the utility
of credit ratings, if investors instead of debt issuers are charged to pay the rating
fee. The presented model abstracts from the possibility of opportunistic behavior
of CRAs. Moral hazard aspects between the rated issuer of a debt instrument and
the CRAs, which were central in the analysis in chapter 3, are excluded from the
analysis. Therefore, the aim is not to analyze the e¤ects of potential conicts of
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interest between the CRAs and the rated entity in the applied model, but rather to
concentrate on the role of credit ratings as a coordination mechanism that increases
nancial market stability.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a
review on the related literature. In section 4.3, we introduce the model framework
and analyze the role of rating fees for the ability of credit ratings to increase nancial
market stability. Finally, section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
The literature on the role of CRAs in nancial markets has largely an empirical
focus. The empirical literature analyzes for example the performance of CRAs (see
Galil, 2003), their impact on capital ows (see Dodd & Setty, 2003) or the inuence
of the business cycle on credit ratings (see Amato & Furne, 2004). While CRAs
have been extensively analyzed empirically, there is a lack of theory in the literature
(Cantor, 2004).
On the one hand, credit ratings seem to play an important role in nancial
markets, as nearly all issued debt products receive a credit rating. On the other
hand, nancial economics literature partially considers the importance of credit
ratings with scepticism. There is an essential disagreement, on whether credit ratings
play a meaningful economic role and whether credit ratings have real informational
content. For example Partnoy (1999) claims that credit ratings are only important,
because they are used in the regulation of nancial market participants. Other
authors have the opinion that the importance of credit ratings is exaggerated, since
credit ratings changes often lag the market and the markets often anticipates ratings
changes (see Brealey & Myers, 2002). The largest part of the existing theoretical
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literature, such as Millon & Thakor (1984), Boom (2001) or Mukhopadhyay (2004)
analyze the role of CRAs under the assumption that the CRA has a technology
to generate new information for market participants. In those contributions, the
authors do not take into account the criticism that CRAs might not be able to
provide new information. Implications regarding the concentrated market structure
in the CRA sector provide Lizzeri (1999) and Doherty et al. (2007). Lizzeri (1999)
shows that more competition can lead to full information revelation and Doherty et
al. (2007) provide empirical evidence that competition improves rating quality.
In contrast to the existing theoretical literature, Boot et al. (2006) motivate the
useful role of credit ratings as a coordination mechanism in situations, where multiple
equilibria exist. The key assumption in their approach is that a certain fraction of
the investor community is restricted by regulation to invest only in instruments with
a credit rating that reects at least investment-grade. In the presence of multiple
equilibria, those investors, which rely their investment decision and their required
debt repayment on the observed credit rating, can lead to the desired "good" equi-
librium and therefore reduce nancial market fragility. Boot et al. (2006) show that
a CRA not necessarily has to provide new information to the market in order to
play a useful role in increasing nancial market stability. Using the framework of
Boot et al. (2006), we analyze the e¤ects of revenue creation of CRAs on nancial
market stability and derive implications referring to competition in the CRA sector.
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4.3 The Model
This section introduces a model to analyze the stabilizing role of CRAs in nancial
markets, especially concentrating on the role of rating fees. Part 4.3.1 introduces
the assumptions and the framework of the model, which is based on the approach
in Boot et al. (2006). What follows in part 4.3.2 is the illustration of the stabilizing
mechanism of credit ratings by coordinating the beliefs of external investors. The
model then focuses on the consequences of an increase of the rating fee, which has
to be paid by the issuer of a debt instrument in part 4.3.3 and then distinguishes
between voluntary and mandatory credit ratings in part 4.3.4. Part 4.3.5 analyzes
the robustness of the implications on nancial market stability by charging external
investors instead of the issuer of the debt instrument for the rating fee.
4.3.1 Framework and Assumptions
A representative, risk neutral investment bank (IB) has the choice to invest either
in a portfolio with low risk (LR) or in a portfolio with high risk (HR). Portfolio LR
generates a payo¤	LR > 0 in the case of success with probability pLR 2 [0; 1] and a
payo¤ of zero in the case of failure with probability (1  pLR). Hence, portfolio LR
yields an expected payo¤ pLR	LR. The high-risk portfolio (HR) generates a higher
payo¤ 	HR (> 	LR) in the case of success with a probability pHR 2 [0; 1] which is
smaller than pLR of portfolio LR (pHR < pLR). In the case of failure with probability
(1  pHR), project HR generates a payo¤ of zero. The success probability of the two
portfolios can also be considered as the quality of the portfolio, whereat a higher
quality is equivalent to a higher success probability. The expected payo¤of portfolio
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LR is assumed to be larger than the expected payo¤ of portfolio HR:
pLR	
LR > pHR	
HR
Therefore, investment of the representative IB in portfolio LR is rst-best e¢ cient.
For being able to invest in one of the two portfolios, the investment bank needs to
raise debt nance of an amount d > 0 from external investors. The IB is assumed
to have no own funds initially, therefore investment of the IB relies entirely on debt
nance.
External investors, which provide debt nance for the investment bank, are as-
sumed to be risk neutral, too.52 The qualities of the two possible portfolios LR and
HR, the IB can invest in, are assumed to be public observable. Nevertheless, ex-
ternal investors cannot contract the investment bank to invest in a specic portfolio.
Instead, external investors require a debt repayment Di > 0 with i 2 [LR;HR] ac-
cording to the type of portfolio which they expect the IB will choose. We assume a
perfectly competitive credit market and for simplication reasons a risk-free interest
rate of zero. If external investors expect that the IB will invest in portfolio HR, they
require a high repayment DHR > 0. Instead, if they expect that the IB will choose
portfolio LR they require a low repayment DLR < DHR. Since in the case of failure,
both portfolios yield a payo¤of zero, external investors then get a repayment of zero
and the investment bank defaults. Since we assume risk neutrality and a risk free
interest rate of zero, the expected repayment is equal to the amount of debt d. If
external investors expect the choice of portfolio LR, we have:
pLRD
LR + (1  pLR) 0 = d  ! DLR =
d
pLR
(16)
52External investors can be regarded as for example banks, investment funds or pension funds
for which risk neutrality can be justied.
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and if external investors expect the choice of portfolio HR, we have:
pHRD
HR + (1  pHR) 0 = d  ! DHR =
d
pHR
(17)
It is obvious, that the required debt repayment in both cases is decreasing in the
quality of each portfolio: @D
i
@pi
< 0. The objective of the IB is to maximize its prots
by investing in one of the two portfolios, given the expectations of external investors,
which are reected in the amount of required debt repayment. Depending on the
parameters in the model introduced so far, it can be shown that for pLR su¢ ciently
large (pLR  pLR), it is optimal for the IB to select portfolio LR, irrespective which
project external investors expect - even if all external investors would anticipate
investment in the high-risk portfolio and require the corresponding high debt repay-
ment DHR. If the quality of portfolio LR is high enough, the rst-best investment
decision will always be established. Therefore, if pLR  pLR, it is rational for ex-
ternal investors to expect the choice of portfolio LR and to require a debt repayment
of DLR. We dene cases, where pLR  pLR as region C. The optimal decision of
the IB is again independent of the external investorsexpectations, if the quality of
portfolio LR is su¢ ciently low (pLR <p
¯
LR). If the quality of the rst-best portfolio is
below a lower bound p
¯
LR, it is optimal for the IB to invest in the high-risk portfolio
HR, even if all external investors would require a low debt repayment DLR. Hence-
forth, external investors will rationally require a high debt repayment, if the quality
of portfolio LR is su¢ ciently small. We dene cases, where pLR <p
¯
LR as region A.
While the decision of the investment bank is clear, if the quality of project LR lies
in either region A or region C, the decision of the IB looks di¤erent, if portfolio LR
has intermediate quality (p
¯
LR  pLR < pLR), which is dened as region B. For
qualities of portfolio LR in region B, the choice of the investment bank depends on
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the expectations of external investors. The IB will choose the rst-best portfolio
LR, if external investors expect the choice of portfolio LR and accordingly require
a low debt repayment DLR. Contrary, the IB will optimally decide to choose the
high-risk portfolio HR, if external investors expect the choice of portfolio HR and
accordingly require a high repayment DHR. Since the choice of the IB depends on
the expectations of external investors, multiple equilibria are present, if the low-risk
portfolio has intermediate quality. Proposition 6 provides a summary of the optimal
decision of the IB for di¤erent qualities of portfolio LR.53
Proposition 6 Region A: If pLR <p
¯
LR, the IB optimally chooses portfolio HR,
independent of the expectations and the required debt repayment of external investors.
Region B: If p
¯
LR  pLR < pLR, the choice of the IB depends on the required debt
repayment of external investors. If external investors expect portfolio LR and require
DLR, the IB optimally chooses portfolio LR, and vice versa. In region B, multiple
equilibria are present.
Region C: If pLR  pLR, the IB optimally chooses the rst-best portfolio LR, inde-
pendent of the expectations and the required debt repayment of external investors.
The results of proposition 6 for region B can be further generalized, as will be
shown in the next section: The IB can be induced to optimally choose portfolio
LR, if the fraction of external investors, which require a low debt repayment, is
su¢ ciently large. The investment possibilities of the IB and the expectations of
external investors therefore have an impact on nancial market stability. Since
we assume, that the expected payo¤ of the low-risk portfolio LR is larger than
the expected payo¤ of the high-risk portfolio HR, nancial market stability will be
increased, if the IB decides to invest in portfolio LR instead of portfolio HR (see
53The proofs of proposition 6 and of all following propositions are located in the appendix.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of events.
denition 1).
Denition 1 Financial market stability in the economy is higher, if the IB decides
to invest in the low-risk portfolio LR ("good" equilibrium) instead of the high-risk
portfolio HR ("bad" equilibrium), because pLR	LR > pHR	HR.
The framework of the model is completed by the introduction of a representative,
prot maximizing credit rating agency (CRA), which may issue a credit rating, if
it is hired by the IB or external investors. The credit rating reects the type of the
portfolio, the IB is going to invest. If the CRA is hired, it receives a rating fee  for
its services and issues a credit rating r 2 fg; bg, that is public observable. Depending
on the public observable credit qualities of the two possible portfolios LR and HR,
the CRA issues a good credit rating r(pLR; pHR) = g, if the CRA anticipates that
the IB will invest in portfolio LR. A good credit rating can therefore be interpreted
as an investment-grade rating, because it reects investment in a low-risk portfolio.
The CRA issues a bad credit rating r(pLR; pHR) = b, that can be interpreted as a
speculative-grade rating, if it anticipates, that the IB will decide to invest in portfolio
HR. The sequence of events in the model is illustrated in gure 4.1. At rst, nature
determines the credit qualities of the two portfolios LR and HR. In the next step,
the investment bank or external investors assign a CRA to issue a credit rating r
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and pay in exchange the rating fee . After then, the IB chooses portfolio LR or HR,
conditional on the credit qualities and required debt repayment, which may depend
on the observed credit rating. Finally, the return of the chosen portfolio materializes.
The IB pays back the required debt repayment to external investors, if the portfolio
succeeds and defaults in the case of failure. For credit qualities, which lie in region
A or C, credit ratings do not play any important role. Neither improves a credit
rating nancial market stability nor does it provide additional information to the
market. The reason for that is very straightforward. As proposition 6 shows, the
decision of the IB in which portfolio to invest, is independent of external investors
expectations and the required debt repayment for credit qualities in regions A and
C. Therefore, a CRA would issue a bad credit rating r = b, if pLR <p
¯
LR, and a good
credit rating r = g, if pLR  pLR respectively. Since the decision of the IB is already
clear and anticipated by external investors as well, a credit rating does not provide
any new information to the market. The IB or external investors would in that
case only be willing to pay a rating fee  for a credit rating, if it is mandatory by
regulation to receive a credit rating. If receiving a credit rating would be voluntary,
neither external investors, nor the IB would have an incentive to acquire a credit
rating and pay the rating fee . However, credit ratings are able to play a useful
role concerning nancial market stability, if the credit quality of portfolio LR lies in
region B, where multiple equilibria exist. The next section will take a closer look on
that issue and especially on the role of the rating fee.
4.3.2 Credit Ratings and Multiple Equilibria
This section concentrates on intermediate credit qualities of portfolio LR. As dened
above, for credit qualities in region B multiple equilibria are present, since the
investment decision of the IB depends on the expectations of external investors.
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So far, we assumed a homogenous mass of external investors, which provide debt
nance for the IB, and whereat each single external investor forms her expectations
independently. Now, we assume that a public observable fraction  2 [0; 1] of
external investors is restricted by regulation to invest only in products with a certain
quality. Examples for those investors can be banks, insurance companies or pension
funds. In the following, as in Boot et al. (2006), we label those external investors as
"institutional investors". In the framework, institutional investors are restricted to
invest only in products with investment-grade rating (r = g), which reects, that the
investment bank chooses the low-risk portfolio. Therefore, institutional investors are
allowed to invest, if credit quality lies in region A, whereat the IB always chooses the
low-risk portfolio, and are prohibited to invest, if the credit quality of portfolio LR
lies in region C, whereat it is optimal for the IB to invest in the high-risk portfolio.
If the quality of the low-risk product lies in region B, institutional investors are
only allowed to invest, if the "good" equilibrium will be established - meaning that
the IB decides to invest in portfolio LR. If the CRA issues a good credit rating r = g,
institutional investors are allowed to invest and require a low debt repayment DLR.
All other investors - fraction (1  ) - form their expectations irrespective of the
issued credit rating, but those investors are assumed to be aware of the repayment
decision of institutional investors. If institutional investors require the low debt
repayment and the other investors the high repayment, the investment bank will be
confronted with a total debt repayment D, given by:
D = DLR + (1  )DHR (18)
Facing a required debt repayment of D, for which DLR  D  DHR, the invest-
ment bank makes its decision to choose either the low-risk or the high-risk project.
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The fraction of institutional investors is assumed to be public observable. Therefore,
D is known by the investment bank as well as by all external investors. Facing a
total debt repayment D, the IB chooses project LR, if D is su¢ ciently low and
project HR, if D is su¢ ciently large. Because the size of D depends on , @D

@
< 0,
the possibility to induce the IB to establish the good equilibrium, depends on the
fraction of institutional investors. The next two sections analyze in detail the de-
cision of the investment bank and the inuence of the rating fee i with i 2 fIB; IIg
that has to be paid by the investment bank (i = IB), if credit ratings are either
mandatory by regulation or the decision, to obtain a credit rating is voluntary. Addi-
tionally, we analyze the inuence of the rating fee, if institutional investors (i = II)
are charged to pay for the credit rating.
4.3.3 Rating Fee and Financial Market Stability
Again, a situation is considered, in which the IB and external investors are confron-
ted with a credit quality of the low-risk project in the multiple equilibria region B.
For the moment, we assume that receiving a credit rating is mandatory, and that
the IB has to pay for a costly credit rating that is issued by a credit rating agency
(CRA). Since we assume that the IB has no own funds, it has to raise total debt
nance D from external investors that covers the amount that is invested in the
portfolio d plus the rating fee IB: D = d + IB. As mentioned above, we assume
that there exists a fraction  of institutional investors that is only allowed to invest,
if the IB chooses the low-risk portfolio. If the CRA issues a credit rating r = g,
which reects the choice of the low-risk project, institutional investors require a debt
repayment D̂LR, which is given by
d+ IB = pLRD̂LR  ! D̂LR = DLR +
IB
pLR
(19)
70
4. CRAS AND FINANCIAL MARKET STABILITY
with DLR = dpLR . The other part of investors (1  ) forms its own expectations,
irrespective of an observed credit rating. If they anticipate that the IB will choose
the high-risk portfolio, they require a high debt repayment D̂HR, which is given by
d+ IB = pHRD̂HR  ! D̂HR = DHR +
IB
pHR
(20)
with DHR = dpHR . Confronted with a debt repayment as dened in equation (18)
with D̂ = D̂LR+(1  ) D̂HR, the expected prot of the IB, if it chooses portfolio
LR and taking into account the rating fee IB, is given by:
E (LR) = pLR

	LR   D̂

+ (1  pLR) 0
 ! E (LR) = pLR
h
	LR   D̂LR   (1  ) D̂HR
i
(21)
If the investment fails - with probability (1  pLR) - the prot of the IB is zero
and cannot be negative, since we assume limited liability. If the investment was
successful - with probability pLR - the IB receives the portfolios payo¤ 	LR and
pays back the required debt repayment D̂ to external investors. In contrast, the
expected prot of investing in portfolio HR, is accordingly given by:
E (HR) = pHR
h
	HR   D̂LR   (1  ) D̂HR
i
(22)
The IB would optimally invest in portfolio LR and establish the good equilibrium,
if the expected prot of choosing portfolio LR is larger than the expected prot of
choosing portfolio HR. The IB is indi¤erent, if the expected prots of both portfolios
are equal:
E (LR) = E (HR)
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 ! pLR
h
	LR   D̂
i
= pHR
h
	HR   D̂
i
(23)
Equation (23) can now be solved for the proportion of institutional investors ̂
that is necessary to assure that the IB is indi¤erent between the two portfolios, by
using (19)-(22) and given the values of pLR, pHR, 
IB, 	LR, and 	HR:
̂ =
(pLR   pHR)DHR   (pLR	LR   pHR	HR) +

pLR pHR
pHR

IB
(pLR   pHR) (DHR  DLR) +

pLR pHR
pHR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
> 0 (24)
As shown above, the total debt repayment D̂ is decreasing, if the fraction of
institutional investors increases (@D̂

@
< 0). Therefore, the IB would optimally choose
portfolio LR, which leads to the good equilibrium, if the proportion of institutional
investors is larger than the critical value ̂ in equation (24), because for   ̂ the
expected prot of investing in portfolio LR is larger, compared to portfolio HR:
E (LR)  E (HR). In the case of   ̂, the CRA issues a credit rating r = g
and the other part of the investor community (1 ), which is aware of the required
debt repayment of institutional investors  and the implicit portfolio choice of the
investment bank, also anticipates that the good equilibrium will be established and
optimally sets the required debt repayment equal DLR. From this follows that the
IB is confronted with the total debt repayment of D = DLR.
If the proportion  is instead lower than ̂, it is optimal for the IB to invest in
portfolio HR and the bad equilibrium will be established, because for  < ̂ we have
E (LR) < E (HR). In that case, the CRA issues a bad credit rating r = b and the
institutional investors are prohibited to invest. If institutional investors are excluded
from investing, the entire debt nancing will be provided by the other investors. In
that case the other external investors form their expectations independent from the
observed credit rating. Therefore, the portfolio choice of the IB still depends on the
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expectations of external investors and multiple equilibria are still present.
As in Boot et al. (2006), the credit rating acts as a coordination mechanism,
because a part of the investor community sets the required debt repayment according
to the observed credit rating. Equation (24) shows that the possibility of a credit
rating to play a useful role, strictly depends on the fraction of investors, which
bases its expectations on the observed credit rating. The useful role of a credit
rating is derived by the possibility to solve the problem of multiple equilibria that is
present for intermediate credit qualities of portfolio LR in region B. With obtaining
a credit rating, it is possible to establish the good equilibrium with certainty for
credit qualities in region B, while without a credit rating, the investment decision
depends on the uncoordinated expectations of external investors, and the possibility
of a resulting bad equilibrium cannot be eliminated in advance, like it is possible
with a credit rating for   ̂. Proposition 7 summarizes the coordinating function
of credit ratings.
Proposition 7 If the proportion of institutional investors  exceeds the critical level
̂, the investment bank optimally chooses portfolio LR, the CRA issues a correspond-
ing credit rating r = g, signalling the good equilibrium, and all investors optimally
set the required debt repayment to DLR.
If the proportion of institutional investors  is lower than the critical level ̂, the
CRA issues a corresponding low credit rating r = b, institutional investors are not
allowed to invest. Multiple equilibria are still possible.
Furthermore, from equation (24) follows that the critical proportion of institu-
tional investors ̂ is decreasing for better credit qualities of the low risk portfolio
pLR. Let D be the debt repayment for which the IB is indi¤erent between portfolio
LR and portfolio HR. Then, from equation (23) follows that D can be formulated
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as:
D =
pLR	LR   pHR	HR
pLR   pHR
Using that expression in equation (24), the critical proportion of institutional in-
vestors can be reformulated as:
̂ =
DHR  D + 1pHR 
IB
DHR  DLR + 1pLR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
(24)
Because @DLR
@pLR
< 0 and @D

@pLR
> 0, if follows from equation (24) that @̂
@pLR
< 0.
Therefore, a lower proportion of institutional investors is necessary to establish the
good equilibrium, if the credit quality of portfolio LR increases. The intuition for
that result is that an increase in the credit quality of portfolio LR decreases the
required debt repayment of institutional investors. Therefore, the IB is already with
a lower fraction of institutional investors indi¤erent between portfolio LR and HR
and the good equilibrium can be established more easily with better credit qualities
of the good portfolio LR. Furthermore, it can be shown that ̂ depends on the
amount of debt d that is needed to invest in one of the two portfolios. The required
debt repayment of external investors is increasing, if the amount of provided debt
increases: @Di
@d
= 1
pi
> 0 with i 2 [LR;HR]. From this follows that the critical share
of institutional investors is increasing with the amount of debt nance: @̂
@d
> 0. The
intuition is, again, straightforward. As the amount of debt nance increases, the
required debt repayment increases, irrespective whether external investors expect the
choice of portfolio LR or HR. In order to keep the total amount of debt repayment
constant, such that the IB remains indi¤erent between portfolio LR and HR, the
share of institutional investors, which require a low debt repayment, has to increase.
Proposition 8 summarizes the properties of ̂.
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Proposition 8 The critical share of institutional investors ̂ increases and therefore
nancial market stability decreases, if
- the credit quality of the low-risk portfolio pLR deteriorates,
- the amount of debt nance d increases.
The CRA, which produces the credit rating, is assumed to require the rating fee
IB for its services. The rating fee increases the amount of debt, the IB has to raise
from external investors, and therefore increases the required debt repayment, which
is lower in the case, when external investors expect the choice of portfolio LR. The
inuence of the rating fee on the critical fraction of institutional investors can be
analyzed by looking at the partial derivative of (24) with respect to IB. Because
1
pLR
< 1
pHR
and 0 < pLR pHR
pLR
< 1, it follows that
@̂
@IB
> 0 (25)
Equation (25) shows that the critical share of institutional investors must be higher,
if the rating fee increases. As already mentioned, the amount of debt increases, when
the rating fee becomes larger. Institutional investors require a lower debt repayment,
if they observe a good credit rating, in contrast to investors, who probably expect
the choice of the high-risk portfolio. Therefore, the fraction of institutional investors
has to increase, too, because only as ̂ increases, the total required debt repayment
is low enough to induce the IB to choose the low-risk portfolio and to establish
the good equilibrium. It is obvious that the size of the rating fee has consequences
for nancial market stability in the applied framework. Financial market stability
can be increased, if the rating fee will be reduced. The reason for this is that less
investors, who follow the observed credit rating are necessary to establish the good
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equilibrium.
One policy implication that can be derived from this result is to analyze whether
the market price of a credit rating is too high and eventually to take actions to
decrease the market rating fees. A market rating fee could be ine¢ ciently high,
if for example the rating technology is ine¢ ciently costly or if there is a lack of
competition in the sector of CRAs. According to standard microeconomics theory,
the rating fee would be higher than the competitive rating fee, if some few CRAs
have market power and the possibility to set prices. Taking a closer look at the
current state in nancial markets reveals that the rating market is dominated by
three big CRAs, which earn very high, quasi-monopoly prots.54 Therefore, more
intensive competition in the rating sector, which would lead to lower rating fees,
would be desirable, since in the presence of multiple equilibria, the good equilibrium
could then be established more easily according to the presented theory.
Very often, institutions of nancial supervision themselves limit market entry
for competitors. For being eligible to the use for certain regulatory purposes in the
U.S., a CRA hat to be recognized by the U.S. security and exchange commission
(SEC). Until 2005 only three CRAs received the status of being nationally recognized
statistical ratings organizations (NRSRO).55 In 2007, the SEC adopted rules to
implement provisions of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 2006, among others
that the NRSRO status has to be renewed regularly and that the recognition process
should be simplied (see SEC, 2007). Today, already seven CRAs received NRSRO
status and the SEC reacted on the public pressure for more competition among
CRAs by enlarging the number of recognized CRAs. The theoretical approach in
54For example Moodys realized an operating margin of 61.8% in 2006, and comparably Standard
& Poors 43% (see Moodys, 2007 and Standard & Poors, 2007). Although both CRAs operate in
the same market, there is obviously not much competition regarding rating fees.
55Those agencies were Standard&Poors, Moodys and Fitch. For more information on SEC
requirements for recognizing a CRA, see for example BIS (2000).
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Figure 4.2: Increase of the rating fee IB.
this paper supports the e¤orts to promote competition by showing that a resulting
reduction in rating fees would be valuable for nancial market stability.56
Apart from the inuence of the rating fee on the critical fraction of institutional
investors, a second implication can be derived. Proposition 6 showed that multiple
equilibria are possible and therefore credit ratings are most valuable, if the low-risk
portfolio has an intermediate credit quality (p
¯
LR  pLR < pLR). As has been shown
above, for credit qualities in region B the decision of the IB to invest in one of the two
possible portfolios depends on the required debt repayment. If the rating fee would
be increased, the total required debt repayment would increase, too. Therefore, the
good equilibrium only can be established for better credit qualities of the low-risk
portfolio than before. From this follows that an increase in the rating fee leads to
an increase of the threshold values p
¯
LR and pLR as well. Figure 4.2 shows that for
higher rating fees, region B moves to the right, which means that region A becomes
larger and region C smaller. The raise of p
¯
LR as 
IB increases, implies that some
portfolios with a credit quality in region B deteriorate to region A, in which the IB
always optimally decides to choose the high-risk portfolio. Therefore, a higher rating
56Related to our result, Doherty et al. (2007) show empirically, that more competition among
CRAs leads to higher rating qualities and lower rating fees. Lizzeri (1999) shows that competition
among certication intermediaries improves information revelation.
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fee increases nancial market fragility independent of the fraction of institutional
investors, since a credit rating is no more able to play a potential valuable role
for those credit qualities of the low-risk portfolio, which are lower than the new
lower bound of credit qualities p
¯
0
LR (with p
¯
LR <p
¯
0
LR). Related, a raise of pLR as
IB increases, implies that some credit qualities that were in region C before, are
now located in the multiple equilibria region B. Again, this implies a reduction in
nancial market stability, because for credit qualities in region C, always the good
equilibrium occurs, while for credit qualities in region B, the possibility to establish
the good equilibrium depends on the fraction of institutional investors. Proposition
9 summarizes the implications of lower rating fees for nancial market stability.
Proposition 9 A reduction of the rating fee IB increases nancial market sta-
bility, because (i) the critical fraction of institutional investors decreases for given
intermediate credit qualities (region B), and (ii) the range of credit qualities, for
which the good equilibrium can be established, will be increased (region A decreases,
region C increases).
4.3.4 Mandatory versus Voluntary Credit Ratings
Proposition 6 showed that it is optimal for the IB to choose portfolio LR and rational
for the investors to require the low debt repayment, if the credit quality of LR lies
in region C. A CRA that is assigned and paid by the IB would issue a good credit
rating r = g in that case. If getting rated would be voluntary, the IB would in
that case decide not to obtain a costly credit rating, because its expected prot
would be higher without a credit rating, since the rating fee would increase the debt
repayment. Hence, regarding nancial market stability, it is irrelevant, whether a
credit rating is assigned or not in that case. Similarly, an IB would not be willing to
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pay for a costly credit rating, if the credit quality of portfolio LR is located in region
A. Irrespective of a credit rating and the required debt repayment, it is optimal for
the IB to choose portfolio HR and hence optimal not to obtain a costly credit rating,
which would reduce the IBs expected prot. Again, it has no inuence on nancial
market stability, whether a credit rating would be mandatory or voluntary.
As was shown above, for credit qualities of portfolio LR in region B, a credit rat-
ing can help to guarantee the good equilibrium and henceforth to improve nancial
market stability, if the fraction of institutional investors, which follow the observed
credit rating is large enough. In that case, a credit rating, which in that case would
be r = g, would be assigned by the IB only, if the expected prot of the IB with
credit rating would be larger than the expected prot without a credit rating. The
expected prot with credit rating E (r) and for   ̂, as shown above in section
4.3.3, is given by E (r) = pLR

	LR  DLR   
IB
pLR

. Without a credit rating, insti-
tutional investors are prohibited from investing, and debt nance will be supplied
by other uncoordinated external investors. Depending on the share of external in-
vestors, that requires the low debt repayment, the IB would then select optimally
portfolio LR or HR. Let the expected prot without a credit rating be denoted as
E (n). The IB is then willing to obtain a costly credit rating, if E (r)  E (n).
This is satised for a rating fee IB  , where  is the expected value of a credit
rating:  = pLR (	LR  DLR)   E (n). The IB would not be willing to request a
credit rating, if the rating fee exceeds the individual expected value of a credit rating
, and hence, multiple equilibria would still be present. From this nding directly
follows that too high rating fees, possibly resulting from market power of some few
CRAs, are even more harmful for nancial market stability, if credit ratings are
voluntary. The reason is that in cases, where IB > , the IB would entirely abstain
from buying a credit rating, even if a credit rating could play a useful coordinating
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role (i.e.   ̂) to x the "good" equilibrium. On the other hand, if credit ratings
are mandatory and the fraction of institutional investors is lower than the critical
value ( < ̂), a CRA would issue a bad credit rating r = b and multiple equilibria
would still be present. For the case of voluntary credit ratings, an IB would not be
willing to assign a costly credit rating if  < ̂. No credit rating would be issued
in that case and, again, multiple equilibria would still be possible. Again, regarding
nancial market stability, it is irrelevant whether credit ratings are mandatory or
voluntary for credit qualities in region B and  < ̂.
Another insight of the last section, which is illustrated in gure 4.2, implied
that the decision of an IB to request a credit rating, increases region A and reduces
region C. If the credit quality of portfolio LR would fall in region A with a credit
rating and then receive a bad rating r = b, it would be preferable not to buy a
credit rating and thus to remain in region B, with at least having the possibility to
realize the good equilibrium. The same is true for marginal credit qualities, which
deteriorate from region C to region B. In that case, it is again preferable to forgo a
costly credit rating, because the IB would maximize its prots, if the credit quality of
portfolio LR remains in region C. Altogether, the model predicts that credit ratings
are most valuable, if credit ratings are voluntary and if the rating fee is su¢ ciently
low (IB  ). If the rating fee is instead ine¢ ciently high (IB > ), credit ratings
only play a valuable role for credit qualities in region B, when credit ratings are
mandatory and the fraction of institutional investors is su¢ ciently large.
Todays nancial markets not only show rating fees that are presumably above
the competitive level, but also quasi-mandatory credit ratings. Actually every debt
product that is issued in capital markets is rated and therefore it seems that credit
ratings can be regarded as quasi-mandatory. The model in that chapter would pre-
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dict that the negative e¤ect of ine¢ ciently high rating fees on nancial market stabil-
ity is to some degree dampened by the obviously unwritten law of quasi-mandatory
credit ratings. Even though rating fees are high, the model predicts that credit rat-
ings help to establish the good equilibrium for intermediate credit qualities, if issuers
are forced to obtain a credit rating and the fraction of the investor community that
follows the observed credit rating is large enough.
4.3.5 Robustness: Institutional Investors pay Rating Fee
So far, it has been assumed that the IB, or generally speaking, the issuer of a debt
instrument has to pay the rating fee. This assumption coincides widely with reality,
as today all big CRAs charge the issuer for the rating fee. In contrast, the big CRAs
earned their revenues until the early 1970s by charging the investors for the provided
information. Nowadays, smaller CRAs sometimes charge investors, not issuers, to
pay for their credit ratings. BIS (2000) argues that this di¤erence in charging
rating fees "probably arises from global reputation, regulatory certication, and
general availability of rating information". White (2001) explains the dominance of
charging the issuer of a debt instruments with the need to reassure nervous investors
and the di¢ culties in preventing free-riding by investors on credit ratings, once
they are published. Moodys argues on its website57 that the rationale for charging
issuers is "[...] that issuers should pay for the substantial value objective ratings
provide in terms of market access. In addition, it was recognized that the increasing
scope and complexity of the capital markets demanded sta¢ ng at higher levels of
compensation than could be received from publication subscriptions alone." Besides
those arguments in favour of issuer fees, it has frequently been criticized that issuer
fees would be one source of conicts of interest. That is because a CRA would be
57see www.moodys.com
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willing to provide the rated issuer that pays for the service with favourable credit
ratings.
In that section, we check the robustness of the results regarding nancial market
stability by assuming that institutional investors, instead of the IB, now are charged
to pay the rating fee. The aim of this exercise is to discriminate between the two
possible payment schemes as to nancial market stability, even if potential conicts
of interest and opportunistic behavior are excluded from the analysis. The rating
fee that is charged from institutional investors is dened as II > 0. Institutional in-
vestors, which are allowed to invest, if a good credit rating would be issued, will now
require a debt repayment, such that the expected repayment covers their expenses,
which consists of the amount of debt d plus the rating fee.
d+ II = pLR ~DLR  ! ~DLR =
d+ II
pLR
(26)
Since the entire rating fee is now nanced by institutional investors, the required
debt repayment of all other external investors is given by equations (16) or (17)
respectively. Analog to the analysis above58, facing a required debt repayment ~DLR
of a fraction  of institutional investors and for credit qualities of portfolio LR in
region B, the IB compares the expected prots of investing in portfolio LR with
those of portfolio HR. The total debt repayment is now given by ~D =  ~DLR +
(1  )DHR:
pLR
h
	LR   ~D
i
= pHR
h
	HR   ~D
i
(27)
Solving equation (27) for  leads to the critical share of institutional investors ~, for
58see equations (23) and (24).
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which the IB is indi¤erent between portfolio LR and HR:
~ =
(pLR   pHR)DHR   (pLR	LR   pHR	HR)
(pLR   pHR) (DHR  DLR) 

pLR pHR
pLR

II
(28)
If   ~, the IB optimally chooses portfolio LR. In that case, the CRA would issue
a good credit rating r = g and institutional investors would be allowed to invest.
Since  is assumed to be observable, institutional investors would only be willing
to pay for a credit rating if   ~, because only then they are allowed to invest.59
From equation (28) follows directly that the critical fraction of institutional investors
increases for higher rating fees:
@~
@II
> 0
The rating fee has again a negative e¤ect on nancial market stability, since a higher
fraction of institutional investors is necessary to establish the good equilibrium as
the rating fee increases. This result conrms that the rating fee has the same
robust inuence on nancial market stability, irrespective which party has to pay
the rating fee. Again, this result implies that more competition among CRAs, which
would lead to lower rating fees, would be desirable, since the good equilibrium could
be established more easily. To investigate, which compensation scheme should be
preferred for given rating fees, the critical fraction of institutional investors in the
two considered cases has to be compared. Given the same costs of a credit rating and
assuming the same demand price elasticity of the IB and institutional investors, the
CRA would set the rating fee for institutional investors such that the total revenues
59If  < ~, institutional investors cannot induce the IB to choose portfolio LR (see above). In
that case, institutional investors do not invest and the complete debt is provided by other external
investors, which form their expectations and repayment requirements independently. Multiple
equilibria are still present for  < ~.
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of the CRA are the same as if the IB would be charged to pay the rating fee:
  IB = II  ! II = 

(29)
Using equation (29) in equation (28), the critical fraction of institutional investors,
when the rating fee is charged from institutional investors ~ can now be compared
with the case, when the rating fee is charged from the IB ̂, in equation (24). ~ is
equal ̂, if
 =  =
pLR
pLR   pHR
[pLR (	LR  DLR)  pHR (	HR  DLR)] (30)
For  <  follows from equation (30) that ~ < ̂, and for    that ~  ̂.
Proposition 10 summarizes the implications for nancial market stability, if the
rating fee is charged from institutional investors.
Proposition 10 If the rating fee is charged from institutional investors, (i) the
critical proportion of institutional investors that is necessary to establish the good
equilibrium increases as the rating fee increases ( @~
@II
> 0), (ii) for  <  the good
equilibrium can be established more easily compared to charging the fee from the IB
(~ < ̂).
For rating fees lower than  and if the CRA charges the rating fee from in-
stitutional investors, a lower fraction of institutional investors would be needed to
establish the good equilibrium. On the other hand, the good equilibrium can be
reached more easily, if the issuer of a debt instrument (in our setup the IB) pays
the fee, when the fee is larger than . Using equation (30) in equation (24) or (28),
it can be shown that lim
!
~ = 1 and lim
!
̂ = 1. Since  2 [0; 1], it follows directly
that credit ratings are no more able to act as a coordination mechanism for  > ,
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because the critical proportion of institutional investors would in that case be  > 1,
irrespective which party pays the rating fee. The intuition why ~ < ̂ for  <  is
as follows: If the IB has to pay the rating fee, the IB is confronted with an additional
debt repayment for the credit rating given by  
pLR
+ (1  ) 
pHR
. If instead insti-
tutional investors have to pay the rating fee, the additional debt repayment is given
by 
pLR
. Since pLR > pHR, for all  2 [0; 1] follows that pLR  

pLR
+ (1  ) 
pHR
.
Because the IB is confronted with a lower additional debt repayment, that origin-
ates from the credit rating, if the rating fee is charged from institutional investors,
a lower fraction  is necessary to establish the good equilibrium.
Irrespective which side - the issuer of a debt instrument or investors - has to pay
the rating fee, the model predicts that a reduction of the rating fee would help to
increase nancial market stability in situations, where multiple equilibria are present.
Additionally, the model shows that credit ratings would lose entirely their capacity
to act as a stabilizing coordination mechanism, if the rating fee would be  > .
As to regulation, the model recommends to charge the rating fee from institutional
investors, because the "good" equilibrium could be established more easily as was
shown above. A side-e¤ect of this payment scheme would be the elimination of
the potential conict of interest between CRA and the debt issuer.60 However, this
recommendation assumes the same willingness of both parties to pay a certain rating
fee and does not take into account potential e¢ ciency gains of charging the fee from
debt issuers rather from a dispersed investor community, as for example the public
good character of information and free-riding of other investors, once the rating is
published.
60For the analysis of conicts of interest see chapter 3.
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4.4 Conclusion
Credit ratings do not only inuence the nance costs of a debt issuer, but also the
possibility to reach a wide investor base, as very often, investors are regulated to in-
vest only in instruments with a certain credit rating. That paper contributes to the
understanding of the role, CRAs and their credit ratings play in nancial markets.
Boot et al. (2006) motivate credit ratings as a coordination instrument in envir-
onments, where multiple equilibria exist. The ability of credit ratings to increase
nancial market stability relies on the assumption that a su¢ ciently large part of
the investor community uses the observed credit rating for its investment decision.
That paper extends the model of Boot et al. (2006) by the introduction of rating
fees. With that extension, we were able to analyze implicitly, whether the frequent
argued criticism on the concentrated market structure in the CRA sector, which
may have led to ine¢ ciently high rating fees, has negative implications regarding
nancial market stability and whether there is a need for regulatory intervention.
We showed that the rating fee negatively inuences the ability of credit ratings to
improve nancial market stability, because the necessary fraction of institutional
investors, which relies its investment decision on the observed credit rating, has to
increase. This result implies that more competition in the rating sector that would
lead to lower rating fees is desirable. Furthermore, we showed that an ine¢ cient
high rating fee is even more harmful, when getting a credit rating is voluntary. The
intuition is that a rating fee that is too high, might keep o¤ the issuer of a debt
instrument to obtain a credit rating. The model concludes that in the presence of
ine¢ ciently high rating fees, credit ratings only can play a stabilizing role, if credit
ratings are mandatory. CRAs may not necessarily charge the rating fee from issuers
of debt instruments, but they also in principle have the possibility to charge the fee
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from investors. Extending the model by charging the rating fee from institutional
investors that rely their investment decision on the observed credit rating, conrmed
the robustness of the results. Additionally, the model concludes that credit ratings
may be even more valuable, if the rating fee is charged from investors rather from
debt issuers.
One policy implication of the model, that was presented in this paper, is that
more competition in the CRA sector is positive for nancial market stability. If
more intensive competition would reduce rating fees, the stabilizing e¤ect of credit
ratings as a coordination instrument would be facilitated. The relevance of the
results are largely reected in recent changes in the regulatory supervision of CRAs
in the United States. The SEC recently reacted on the frequent criticism that
there is a lack of competition in the CRA sector, by granting NRSRO status to
more CRAs. Until 2005, only three CRAs were recognized by the SEC, today the
number increased up to seven. One goal of the "Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
2006", which passed legislation in September 2006, among others, is the promotion
of competition and facilitation of market entry.
However, it has to be mentioned that some questions are not answered by the
model. First, it was assumed that all parameters about portfolio quality, payo¤s
and structure of the investment community were public observable. It remains to be
analyzed, in how far the stabilizing role of credit ratings is inuenced by uncertainty
about those parameters, especially the fraction of institutional investors. Second, the
presented model excluded moral hazard aspects which may inuence the reliability
of credit ratings. Related, it remains to be investigated what is the optimal number
of recognized CRAs in nancial markets and whether there is a trade-o¤ between
the degree of competition among CRAs (and therefore the level of the rating fee)
and the reliability of credit ratings.
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4.A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of proposition 6. The total debt repayment D, for which the IB is indif-
ferent between portfolio LR and HR, is given by:
pLR (	LR  D) = pHR (	HR  D)
 ! D = pLR	LR   pHR	HR
pLR   pHR
;
and @D

@pLR
> 0, and @D

@pHR
< 0. Let p
¯
LR be the credit quality for which D = DLR.
Then, the IB strictly prefers to choose portfolio HR independent from investors
required debt repayment, if pLR (	LR  DLR) < pHR (	HR  DLR), which is the
case for DLR > D and pLR < p
¯ LR
(Region A). Next, let pLR be the credit quality
(pLR >p
¯
LR) for which D = DHR. Then, it is optimal for the IB to choose portfolio
LR, independent from investorsrequired debt repayment, if pLR (	LR  DHR) 
pHR (	HR  DHR). That is the case, if DHR  D and pLR  pLR (Region C).
Region C is nonempty (pLR < 1), if 1pHR < (	LR   pHR	HR) = (1  pHR); this con-
dition is satised, if pHR is not too small. If portfolio LR has intermediate quality,
p
¯
LR  pLR < pLR (Region B), then DLR  D and DHR > D. In region B, the IB
optimally chooses the portfolio that is anticipated by external investors (multiple
equilibria). Region B is nonempty (p
¯
LR < 1), if (	LR   pHR	HR) = (1  pHR) > 1.
This condition is satised, if pHR is not too large. 
Proof of proposition 7. For E

	LR   D̂

= E

	HR   D̂

, the critical pro-
portion of institutional investors is given by
̂ =
(pLR   pHR) D̂HR   (pLR	LR   pHR	HR)
(pLR   pHR)

D̂HR   D̂LR
 ;
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with D̂HR = DHR + 
IB
pHR
and D̂LR = DLR + 
IB
pLR
. ̂ can be reformulated
as ̂ =
D̂HR 

pLR	LR pHR	HR
pLR pHR

D̂HR D̂LR
. The total debt repayment D, for which the
IB is indi¤erent between portfolio LR and HR, is given by: pLR (	LR  D) =
pHR (	HR  D)  ! D = pLR	LR pHR	HRpLR pHR . Using that formulation for D
 in ̂,
it follows that: ̂ = D̂HR D

D̂HR D̂LR
. By assumption in region B, we have D̂HR > D̂LR
and D̂LR < D < D̂HR, and therefore follows that 0 < ̂ < 1. If  > ̂, then
the total debt repayment D̂ decreases, because @D̂

@
< 0. Therefore, we have
E (LR)  E (HR) for   ̂, and the IB chooses optimally portfolio LR. In
that case the CRA issues a credit rating r = g. Institutional investors are al-
lowed to invest. Other external investors, proportion (1  ), anticipate that the
IB chooses portfolio LR, and therefore rationally require D̂LR. The total debt re-
payment is therefore given by D̂ = D̂LR and the expected prot of the IB is given
by E (LR) = pLR

	LR   D̂LR

. If  < ̂, then the proportion of institutional
investors is too small to induce the IB to choose portfolio LR. The decision of the
IB depends on the expectations of the other external investors, proportion (1  ).
Multiple equilibria are still possible. In that case, the CRA issues a bad credit rat-
ing r = b, institutional investors therefore are not allowed to invest. In that case,
the total debt is provided by other external investor, which form their expectations
independent from a credit rating. Multiple equilibria are still possible.
Proof of proposition 8. The critical proportion of institutional investors is
given by ̂ = D̂HR D

D̂HR D̂LR
, with D̂HR = DHR + 
IB
pHR
, D̂LR = DLR + 
IB
pLR
and
D = pLR	LR pHR	HR
pLR pHR . An increase in the credit quality pLR of portfolio LR leaves
D̂HR unchanged: @D̂HR@pLR = 0. For D̂LR follows that
@D̂LR
@pLR
< 0, since D̂LR = dpLR +
IB
pLR
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and @D̂LR
@pLR
=   1
p2LR
 
d+ IB

< 0. For D, we have
@D
@pLR
=
(1  pLR)	LR + pHR	HR
(pLR   pHR)2
> 0:
Therefore, the denominator of ̂ decreases, whereas the nominator increases. From
this follows that @̂
@pLR
< 0. An increase of the credit quality pLR leads to a reduction
of ̂ and a reduction of pLR to an increase of ̂. An increase in the amount of debt
nance leads to an increase of D̂LR and D̂HR: @D̂LR@d =
1
pLR
> 0 and @D̂HR
@d
= 1
pHR
> 0.
Therefore, we have for ̂:
@̂
@d
=
1
pHR

D̂HR   D̂LR

 

D̂HR  D

1
pHR
  1
pLR


D̂HR   D̂LR
2 :
Rearranging leads to @̂
@d
=
D

1
pHR
  1
pLR

(D̂HR D̂LR)
2 . We assume that pLR > pHR, and therefore
follows that @̂
@d
> 0.
Proof of proposition 9. (i) The critical fraction of institutional investors is given
by equation (24):
̂ =
DHR  D + 1pHR 
IB
DHR  DLR + 1pLR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
:
The partial derivative with respect to the rating fee IB is given by: @̂
@IB
=
1
pHR
h
DHR DLR+ 1pLR

pLR pHR
pLR
i
 

DHR D+ 1pHR 
IB
h
1
pLR

pLR pHR
pLR
i

DHR DLR+ 1pLR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
2 , rearranging leads to
@̂
@IB
=
1
pHR
(DHR  DLR)  1pLR (DHR  D
)
DHR  DLR + 1pLR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
2 :
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Because 1
pHR
> 1
pLR
and DHR > D > DLR, it is obvious that 1pHR (DHR  DLR) >
1
pLR
(DHR  D), and therefore, @̂@IB > 0.
(ii) In region A, the IB would always choose portfolio HR, if pLR

	LR   D̂LR

<
pHR

	HR   D̂LR

, which is the case, if pLR is su¢ ciently small: pLR <p
¯
LR. An
increase of the rating fee IB leads to an increase of debt repayment D̂LR: @D̂LR@IB > 0.
Therefore, the condition for region A is already satised for larger credit qualities
pLR <p
¯
LR with p
¯
LR < p
¯
LR. In region C, the IB would always choose portfolio LR,
if pLR

	LR   D̂HR

 pHR

	HR   D̂HR

, which is the case, if pLR is su¢ ciently
large: pLR > pLR. Again, an increase of the rating fee 
IB leads to an increase of debt
repayment D̂HR: @D̂HR@IB > 0. Therefore, the condition for region C is after an increase
of the rating fee only satised for higher credit qualities than before: pLR > p0LR,
with pLR < p0LR. From this follows that the range of region A increases, while the
range of region C decreases (see gure 4.2).
Proof of proposition 10. If the rating fee is charged from institutional investors,
the critical proportion of institutional investors is given by
~ =
(pLR   pHR)DHR   (pLR	LR   pHR	HR)
(pLR   pHR) (DHR  DLR) 

pLR pHR
pLR

II
:
Since the rating fee shows up in the nominator, if follows directly that @~
@II
> 0. If
instead the rating fee is charged from the IB (see also equation (24)), the critical 
is given by:
̂ =
(pLR   pHR)DHR   (pLR	LR   pHR	HR) +

pLR pHR
pHR

IB
(pLR   pHR) (DHR  DLR) +

pLR pHR
pHR

pLR pHR
pLR

IB
:
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The critical  is equal in both cases, if ~ = ̂. Using   IB and IB = II , it
follows that equality of the LHS and the RHS is satised for the critical rating fee
 = pLR
pLR pHR [pLR (	LR  DLR)  pHR (	HR  DLR)]. In region B, it is assumed
that pLR (	LR  DLR) > pHR (	HR  DLR), and therefore  > 0. Case 1: For
 <  follows that ~ < ̂; in that case the rating fee should optimally be charged
from institutional investors, because a lower proportion of institutional investors is
needed to x the good equilibrium. Case 2: For  >  follows that ~ > ̂. Only
case 1 is relevant, because for using  =  in the equation for ~ or ̂ follows that
 = 1. If  >  credit ratings no more are able to act as a coordination mechanism
since in that case we would have  > 1. 
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5 Concluding Remarks to Chapters 3 and 4
The last two chapters emphasized that CRAs and their credit ratings are able to
play an important role in nancial markets and that their prominent role in todays
nancial markets is therefore justied. The models in both chapters focused on
the interaction between a representative issuer of a debt instrument, a represent-
ative CRA, and external investors. The model, presented in chapter 3, motivated
the useful role of credit ratings by reducing misallocated investment. Credit ratings
were assumed play an active role by providing additional information to market par-
ticipants, which led to an increase in social welfare. The model, presented in chapter
4, motivated the valuable e¤ect of credit ratings by showing that they may act as
a coordination mechanism in the presence of multiple equilibria and thus increase
nancial market stability. In that chapter, the CRA played a beliefs coordinating,
but rather passive role.
Besides the valuable positive e¤ects for nancial markets CRAs are able to cre-
ate, both chapters addressed di¤erent points of criticism CRAs were repeatedly
confronted with over the last years, namely: inaccurate credit ratings, conicts of
interest and the market dominating position of some few CRAs. The rationale for
regulatory intervention in chapter 3 was derived by moral hazard aspects due to un-
observable rating quality and conicts of interest, while adverse consequences of the
market structure in the CRA market were largely excluded. Chapter 4 concludes
that ine¢ ciently high rating fees over the competitive level restrict the valuable
role of credit ratings for nancial market stability, while the model excludes moral
hazard aspects and conicts of interest.
Although the chapters 3 and 4 concentrate on di¤erent aspects concerning which
role CRAs actually play and concerning regulation, the policy implications that
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could be derived by both approaches are highly relevant and complementary. An-
ecdotal evidence shows that the CRA industry is very concentrated (three CRAs
possess about 96% market share) and the possibilities of market entry for new com-
petitors are limited. While reputation is one entry barrier for competitors, market
entry is also limited by regulatory recognition. As already mentioned in chapter
1 the worlds leading CRAs earn very high, quasi-monopoly prots. Additionally,
CRAs very often have been criticized in the past for issuing inaccurate credit ratings
- presumably because of too low rating quality and conicts of interest. Combining
the results of the models in both papers, one recommendation for regulatory au-
thorities (from chapter 4) should be to simplify market entry in order to promote
competition, which would lead to lower rating fees and possibly to higher rating
quality. Additionally, chapter 3 concludes that regulatory minimum rating stand-
ards and a monitoring of potential conicts of interest should be introduced. This
would help to amplify the accuracy and reliability of credit ratings and therefore
increase the social value of credit ratings. Since both chapters concentrated on the
interaction between the rated debt issuer, the CRA, and external investors, stra-
tegic interactions in the CRA sectors were excluded from the analysis. Interesting
questions regarding future research would be for example the market entry and exit
of CRAs, collusion between CRAs, or the optimal size of the CRA sector, and their
implications for regulation.
Some steps in the direction towards the policy recommendations of the last
two chapters was recently made in the USA by the "CRA Reform Act 2006" with
the goal to promote competition and to simplify market entry for competitors (see
CRA Reform Act, 2006). The international organization of security commissions61
(IOSCO) released in 2004 a code of conduct fundamentals for CRAs with the purpose
61Financial regulators of over one hundret countries are a¢ liated with the IOSCO.
94
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS TO CHAPTERS 3 AND 4
to "promote investor protection by safeguarding the integrity of the rating process"
(see IOSCO, 2004). A review of the functional implementation in IOSCO (2007)
showed that the big CRAs largely follow the provisions of the code of conduct, but
unfortunately partially deviate from provisions as to the reduction of conicts of
interest.62 After the subprime loan crisis in 2007 the IOSCO recently modied the
code of conduct by including the prohibition of the joint provision of advice on the
design of structured products and rating of the same product (see IOSCO, 2008).
It remains to be seen whether the voluntary adoption of a code of conducts and
the self-healing of the CRA industry is su¢ cient to restore and strengthen the trust
in credit ratings or whether national regulators will have to intensify and enlarge
regulations and laws for CRAs.
62For example some CRAs do not disclose their compensation arrangements with rated entity
with regards the proportion of non-rating fees and rating fees. This provision of the IOSCO code of
conduct was meant to help investors to determine whether non-rating fees, such as consulting fees,
are high enough to call into question the analytical independence of the CRA. Other CRAs deviate
from the provision to prevent that employes are involved in the rating process and in negotiations
regarding payment and fees - especially in structured nance products. (see IOSCO, 2007)
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Part III
Economics of Banking
6 Costly Bank Capital - Demand and Supply Side
Considerations63
6.1 Introduction
The real-life observation of costly bank capital has inspired economic theorists to
develop models where the cost arises from the specic liquidity creation function of
the bank. Very often, these modelling approaches result in the corner solution of
the regulatory capital requirement, which collides with the actual amount of capital
held in banks64. As a consequence, a lot of theoretical literature concentrates on the
optimal capital adequacy regulation, as well as on the ability of regulators to enforce
the rules. However, banks seem to hold more capital than required, in particular
in less developed countries. This raises the question of a possible trade-o¤ in the
banks capital decision.
This chapter asks what drives the capital decision of a bank and, in particular,
whether supply side restrictions play a determinant role. In doing so, we directly
take a stand in the theoretical debate on bank capital determination. Whereas
Diamond & Rajan (2000, 2001) stress the asset side, Gorton & Winton (1995, 2000)
derive a relation between the cost of capital and the heterogenous liquidity needs of
consumers that buy bank shares. On the other hand, Milne & Whalley (2001) and
63This chapter is based on joint work with Katri Mikkonen.
64See e.g. Bolton & Freixas (2000) and Hellman & al. (2000).
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Milne (2002) argue that the penalty of breaching the regulatory minimum capital
level induces banks to hold bu¤ers above the requirement, implying that regulation
drives the bank capital decision after all.
Earlier empirical literature has almost entirely concentrated on the demand side
factors in determining bank capital. In contrast, we investigate whether supply side
restrictions may play a role in a given market, using both balance sheet data of
multinational banks and market data. As the market of operation of the foreign
units usually di¤ers from the market where the multinational bank acquires its
capital, we use multinational banks as a means to separate the supply side factors
from those of the demand side.
We test the determinants of bank capital in the eight Central and Eastern
European and Baltic countries (CEB) that have recently joined the EU. Due to
the high presence of multinational banks, these markets serve as a good testing en-
vironment. Summary statistics rst show that there is a robust di¤erence between
the capital ratios in domestic and foreign banks in those countries, indicating that
the supply side may matter. We then limit our sample to multinational banks and
run panel regressions on their capital. Explanatory variables include both bank-
and market-specic factors. We nd evidence that factors related to the country of
origin play a role in bank capital determination in the CEB countries.
Finally, we are able to give some tentative policy conclusions. Multinational
banking, even in the form of subsidiaries, may improve stability in markets with
strong capital supply restrictions. However, the motives driving foreign direct in-
vestment may change as soon as the di¤erence between the home and host capital
markets becomes smaller. Therefore, our conclusion shall not be taken as a universal,
one-size-t-it-all rule, but as applying for specic types of markets.
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This chapter is organized as follows: First, section 6.2 gives an overview of the
related empirical literature. Section 6.3 then presents the di¤erent implications of
the theories of liquidity provision. Section 6.4 describes the banking sector in the
CEB region and the data used, and section 6.5 presents some descriptive statistics.
Section 6.6 introduces the model specication used in the regressions. The regression
results are summarized in section 6.7. Finally, section 6.8 concludes.
6.2 Related Literature
Earlier empirical literature has almost entirely concentrated on the demand side
factors in determining bank capital. For example, Altunbas et al. (2000) and Bar-
rios & Blanco (2003) nd empirical evidence on the signicance of bank specic,
solvency related factors for Spain, Yu (2000) for Taiwan, and De Bondt & Prast
(1999) for ve European Union (EU) countries and for the US. In addition, the rst
two papers show that regulatory pressure seems to matter in Spain. However, none
of the above mentioned contributions control for factors linked with the shareholder
characteristics. As to the US, Marcus (1983), and Benston et al. (2003) later on,
nd evidence that the tax treatment of capital items and deposits has had a signic-
ant e¤ect on the amount of bank capital; but again, the institutional environment in
their study a¤ects the demand of capital by the banks, not the supply by the share-
holders. Finally, Saunders & Wilson (1999) nd indirect evidence for the existence
of heterogenous investors, and therefore, for the importance of the distribution of
shareholders and depositors. In particular, the overall risk seems to have remained
stable during the long decline in bank capital and the introduction of safety nets
over the past century, whereas the distribution of risk has strongly shifted towards
equity. This implies that the agents holding equity and deposits have strongly di¤er-
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ent preferences, and that it may matter how these preferences are distributed across
economies. A recent study by the European Central Bank (see ECB, 2007) analyzes
the determinants of bank capital in publicly traded banks in Europe and the US.
The authors nd evidence that standard determinants of rm leverage are also able
to explain capital ratios of large banks in the EU and the US. In particular, the
capital decision of banks seems not to be driven by regulatory capital requirements,
but rather result from an optimizing behavior similar to that of non-nancial rms.
But again, the study concentrates on the demand side and does not directly control
for factors linked with the supply side of bank capital. Flannery & Rangan (2004)
nd evidence that the increase in capital holdings of US banks can be explained by
greater risk exposures of banks and the increased demand of the market that the
default risk of large banks to be priced.
Theoretical literature on multinational banks has not so far profoundly invest-
igated the bank capital question. Indeed, most contributions either ignore capital,
or impose a binding minimum capital requirement. This is understandable due to
the quickly increasing complexity of multinational banking models. Repullo (2001)
considers the determinants of international takeovers and nds out that a takeover
is more likely the smaller is the target bank and the riskier its investments are rel-
ative to the parent bank. Moreover, a takeover is almost always welfare improving.
However, as there is no bank capital in the model, liquidity aspects cannot play
any role. Loranth & Morrison (2003) model minimum bank capital requirements
in a multinational setting and show how they can lead to underinvestment due to
their impact on the value of deposit insurance. However, they as well assume that
banks cannot draw any utility from bank capital. Finally, in a rare e¤ort to endo-
genously model capital of a multinational bank, Mikkonen (2006) shows that with
restrictions on the supply side, multinational banks in general have more capital
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than domestic ones, and that they may appoint more capital to the subsidiary than
it had before the takeover, if the di¤erence between the nancial market conditions
is large enough. The conclusion serves as an inspiration for the empirical work of
this paper.
6.3 Capital Costs, Demand, and Supply
Besides the exogenously motivated capital bu¤er explanation of Milne & Whalley
(2001) and Milne (2002), two complementary theories of endogenous bank cap-
ital formation have recently emerged from the liquidity creation function of banks.
Whereas the Diamond & Rajan (2000, 2001) line of thought emphasizes the informa-
tion problems in the market for bank loans, Gorton & Pennacchi (1990) and Gorton
& Winton (1995) derive the cost of bank capital from information problems and
heterogenous investors in the bank capital market. Since each framework produces
distinguishable predictions as to our empirical results, they are explained more in
detail in this section.
Diamond & Rajan (2000, 2001) show that a bank as an institution can solve the
double hold-up problem related to the investment decision of the agent. The rst
hold-up is caused by the borrowing rm that has specic skills and can therefore
threaten to withdraw from the project. This can be alleviated through relationship
lending, namely by delegating monitoring of the rm to an experienced lender, the
bank. However, since the bank, the so-called relationship lender, gains specic loan
collection skills, it can extract rents from its shareholders through renegotiation,
which gives rise to the second hold-up problem. This in turn can be prevented
via the introduction of a collective action problem of non-insured, uncoordinated
depositors that face a sequential service clause.
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The basic trade-o¤ between bank capital and deposits in Diamond & Rajan
(2000) can be expressed as follows: More capital increases the rents extracted by
the bank and therefore decreases the amount the bank is able to raise and invest.
Deposits, for their part, alleviate the rent extraction problem, on the one hand,
but increase the probability of ine¢ cient liquidation of the bank in presence of
uncertainty on asset values, on the other65. The theory predicts higher bank capital
levels in bank credit markets that are less developed, less transparent, and small in
size. In particular, Diamond and Rajan (2000) assume that there is no aggregate
shortage of liquidity or capital, and that the distribution of investorsendowments
is not critical. Therefore, the supply side does not play a role here.
In contrast, the Gorton & Winton (1995) general equilibrium model derives the
cost of capital from the bank capital markets. As in Gorton & Pennacchi (1990),
capital is informationally sensitive, and because information is costly, there are
both informed and non-informed traders in the market. The coexistence of risk
and private information results in a lemons cost of capital, and there is a trade-o¤
between this cost, on the one hand, and the risk of bank failure, on the other.
Unlike in Diamond & Rajan (2000), the distribution of shares matters in Gorton
& Winton (1995). In particular, as consumers have heterogenous needs for liquidity,
the magnitude and distribution of these needs now determine the cost of capital. For
example, a wealthier shareholder population may have less compelling liquidity needs
than a poorer one. As a consequence, the characteristics of the shareholders make
a di¤erence as to at which price the bank is able to raise capital, in addition to the
characteristics of the market where the bank operates. The theory predicts higher
bank capital levels in bank capital markets where liquidity needs of shareholders are
65Please note that the mechanism presumes that at least some deposits remain outside the
deposit insurance.
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low and uncertainty is high.
It is now clear why the comparison of the two sources of capital costs becomes
particularly interesting in the case of multinational banks. If the factors related to
the demand side dominate, the conditions in the market of operation determine the
cost of capital. However, if the supply side shows some inuence, the conditions
in the market of origin shall play a role. Furthermore, the inuence of the supply
side factors may raise some interesting stability conclusions, as shown in Mikkonen
(2006). The model studies the bank capital of multinational banks and nds out that
multinational banks have more capital than domestic banks when the di¤erences in
capital market conditions are the most pronounced. Interestingly, this coincides with
the case where the presence of multinational banks tends to be stability improving for
the host country. In the following, we therefore ask two related questions: First, in
the sample of multinational banks, do home rather than host market characteristics
matter? This would help us nd evidence for the two distinguishable aspects of
bank capital formation mentioned above. And second, in the sample of all banks,
do multinational banks have more capital than domestic ones? This would lead to
stability conclusions.
6.4 CEB Banking Sector and the Dataset
The bank panel consists of the balance sheet data of 37 domestic banks and 44 subsi-
diaries of multinational banks in the ve Central and Eastern European countries66
and the Baltic states67 (those are abbreviated by the term CEB countries in the
following), for the time period of 2001 to 200568. By limiting the time period, we
66Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia.
67Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
68For some banks, the database misses some observations, and we thus have an unbalanced panel.
Please note, however, that this is simply due to inaccurancies and di¢ culties in data collection and
102
6. COSTLY BANK CAPITAL - DEMAND AND SUPPLY
wish to avoid transitional e¤ects that were still prevalent in the 1990s. The selected
banks comprise at least 80 per cent of total bank assets in each country. Most of
the multinational banks in the sample originate from the 15 old EU member coun-
tries (EU-15)69. Multinational banks not only operate in a subsidiary but also in
a branch structure in the CEB countries, whereby the subsidiary structure by far
dominates.70 Since the bank assets are pooled in the branch case and separated in
the subsidiary case, we included only multinational bank subsidiaries in our data-
set for reasons of data availability. Compared to the EU-15 countries, the banking
sectors in the CEB countries are relatively small and the degree of intermediation
rather low (see ECB, 2005). After several bank failures and systemic crises in the
mid-1990s, a period of restructuring and privatization of the banking sector followed,
and foreign banks entered the market. By the start of our dataset in 2001, most
banks were already privatized, with multinational bank subsidiaries dominating the
banking sectors. Figure 6.1 shows the assets of multinational bank subsidiaries in
per cent of total bank assets in the economy in the time period from 2001 to 2005.
Apart from Slovenia and Latvia, foreign banks own over 70% of total bank assets.
This ratio even exceeds 90% in Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia. Until today, mul-
tinational banks only play a minor role in Slovenia. During the considered time
period, the restructuring and privatization of the Slovenian banking sector was not
yet as progressed as in the other countries in our dataset, and foreign bank entry was
still heavily regulated. By the beginning of the period under consideration, CEB
banking sectors had become broadly competitive. Regarding regulation of the bank-
ing sector, all countries in the dataset apply deposit insurance and capital adequacy
not due to bankruptcies or the like that would require further examination.
69Apart from multinational banks with their headquarters in the EU-15, the panel includes four
subsidiaries originating from the US.
70For a compact overview on the banking structure in the EU see for example ECB (2005).
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Figure 6.1: Ratio of foreign owned bank assets to total bank assets. Data source: EBRD
(2006). (ES: Estonia, LA: Latvia, LI: Lithuania, PO: Poland, CZ: Czech Republic, SLK:
Slovak Republic, SLV: Slovenia, HU: Hungary)
regulations.71
Our aim is to nd determinants for the amount of capital a bank decides to hold.
Especially, we are interested to discriminate between factors related to the demand
and supply sides of bank capital. As already emphasized in the previous section,
multinational banks serve as ideal testing candidates for that task. The reason
behind this is straightforward. For multinational bank subsidiaries, the market of
the source of bank capital, which is mainly the home country of their parent banks,
is di¤erent from the market where those banks operate. Therefore, factors that
a¤ect the level of bank capital can be separated by using data referring to the
demand (market of operation) and supply (market of origin) sides of bank capital.
The variables with potential explanatory power in our dataset can be grouped into
macro variables, on the one hand, and individual balance sheet items, on the other.
To begin with, the macro variables include GDP per capita, di¤erent stock market
measures, and the share of bad loans in host and home countries. GDP per capita
71see EBRD (2006).
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and the di¤erent stock market measures are linked with the wealth and liquidity of
the respective markets, and are therefore important determinants, when it comes
to separating the e¤ects of supply and demand side factors. The amount of bad
loans in the economy approximates the informational asymmetries within the market
in question, and a bank concentration variable captures the characteristics of the
market structure in the CEB countries. Second, we use bank level data as to the
origin of the bank, assets, loans, deposits, and returns. In particular, the market
share of the bank approximates the charter value of the bank. These factors are
to capture the e¤ects of the bank specic business case, which are related to the
demand side.
6.5 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the equity asset ratios (EAR) of the multina-
tional bank subsidiaries and the domestic banks in our sample. For the calculation
of the variable EAR, we use the ratio of book-equity to book-assets, which is taken
from the balance sheets of the banks. Book-equity consists of equity capital plus
disclosed reserves and retained earnings, and can be interpreted as the real eco-
nomic capital of the bank. Our measure of capital complies henceforth with the
classications core capitalor Tier 1 capital, which are used in the Basel I and
II guidelines (see BIS, 1998). The diagram covers 350 bank-year observations in
our sample from 2001 to 2005. Even though a di¤erence in the distributions of the
capital ratios between the two groups is not obvious immediately, the distribution
of EARs can already give some insights on the inuence of capital regulation on
the capital decision of banks. According to the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I), the
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of capital ratios (EAR). Data source: Bank balance sheets from
the banksannual reports.
minimum regulatory capital ratio is 4%.72 This regulatory minimum is calculated
as Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets - whereas assets are split into three
asset classes with weights of 0, 0.5 and 1. In the EARs, which are illustrated in gure
6.2, all book assets are weighted with 1. Therefore, our EAR is a more conservative
measure compared to the Basel I minimum capital requirement. The mean EAR in
our sample is 8.7% for domestic banks and 9.3% for multinational bank subsidiaries
(see also table 6.1). Even with employing EAR as a measure of bank capital, the
banks in our sample clearly hold substantially more capital than is required by reg-
ulation. Consequently, this nding contradicts the theoretical view that the capital
decision of a bank is predominantly inuenced by capital regulation.73 Instead, the
distribution of EAR points to a trade-o¤ in the capital decision that depends on
other inuencing factors than regulation.
72The more commonly used minimum capital ratio of 8% is calculated under consideration of
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (see BIS, 1998). All countries in our dataset, except Estonia (10%) and
Slovenia (10.6%), require a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%.
73see for example Mishkin (2004).
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Our rst exercise is to analyze whether there is a di¤erence between the amounts
of capital that domestic banks and multinational subsidiaries hold. The reason for
this is twofold: First, a possible di¤erence between the two samples serves as an
indicator that adding the supply side factors into the panel regressions may add some
value vis-à-vis the existing empirical literature on bank capital. Second, as explained
in Section 6.3, this will inform us on the stability properties of the multinational
banks in a given market.
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. min max
Domestic 137 8:677 2:778 3:35 18:24
Multinational 213 9:315 3:504 2:08 28:02
Combined 350 9:065 3:250 2:08 28:02
Table 6.1: Summary statistics EAR groups.
Table 6.1 contains the summary statistics as to the EAR of the domestic and
multinational banks in the pooled sample. Looking at the summary statistics, we
see that the EAR seems to be systematically lower for the domestic than for the
multinational banks in the sample. In order to investigate whether the di¤erence
in the EARs of multinational and domestic banks is signicant, we perform a t-
test on the equality of means and a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the
equality of distributions of the two groups in our sample. The results are presented
in Appendix 6.A . The t-test conrms the impression of di¤ering means at a ve per
cent signicance level. The result shows that subsidiaries of multinational banks tend
to have a signicantly higher equity-asset ratio than domestic banks in our sample.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test result is not so clear-cut. Interestingly, excluding
the banks in Slovenia from our sample improves the signicance of the test result
to a ve per cent level, corroborating the result that the EAR for the group of
multinational subsidiary banks contains larger values than the group of domestic
banks in our sample. This might reect the position of Slovenia as an outlier in our
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sample: Until recently, international banks in Slovenia played rather a minor role,
due to heavy regulation of entry.
The somewhat signicant result is, nevertheless, the rst indication towards ac-
knowledging that the supply side might have some importance after all in the de-
termination of bank capital. Indeed, if only factors related to the demand side
mattered, there would be no reason for the amount of capital the bank holds to
di¤er depending on whether the bank is multinational or domestic.
As in Mikkonen (2006), higher capital ratios of multinational banks may indicate
large di¤erences as to the supply of equity funding in the home and the host markets.
Taking a closer look at the stock market total value traded to GDP ratio (SMG)
and the GDP per capita (GDPc) in the home and host countries in the sample of
multinational banks reveals a large di¤erence between the two markets, in particular
if we consider the situation in the beginning of the time span of the data set. Table
6.2 shows the summary statistics of 213 bank-year-observations of SMG and GDPc
for the host and home countries of the multinational banks in our sample. The
Obs Mean Std. Dev.
GDPchome 213 27158:03 5251:67
GDPchost 213 6873:53 2411:01
SMGhome 213 0:689 0:613
SMGhost 213 0:064 0:068
Table 6.2: Summary statistics GDPc, SMG.
means of SMG and GDPc are substantially higher for home than for host countries.
In Mikkonen (2006), foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks have more capital
than the domestic banks operating in the same market, if di¤erences in capital
market conditions are large enough. Taking SMG and GDPc as a measure for
capital market conditions, the di¤erence in means of both SMG and GDPc in the
home and the host market as well as the di¤erence in capital asset ratios (EAR)
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of multinational subsidiaries and domestic banks in our sample speaks in favour of
this conclusion.
6.6 Model Specication
In order to analyze the inuence of supply and demand side conditions on the
capital choice of banks in a given market, we restrict our analysis by considering
multinational bank subsidiaries only. The reason for that proceeding is the following.
As already described in section 6.4, the market of the source of capital is often
di¤erent from the market of operation for multinational bank subsidiaries, whereas
the domestic banks operate and raise capital in the same market. As the explanatory
market variables simultaneously inuence the demand and supply of bank capital
in the case of domestic banks, an identication problem is not present in the case
of multinational bank subsidiaries arises. In the following, we regress the measure
of bank capital in multinational bank subsidiaries on factors that are related with
the subsidiary itself, with the parent bank, and with the macroeconomic conditions
both in the home and host markets. Using the company xed e¤ects, our baseline
panel regression has the following form:
(C  measure)it = + Bit + Mit + k + t + "it
The C-measure denotes the dependent bank capital variable of a multinational
subsidiary i, which is owned by a certain parent bank k in period t.74 As the
dependent variable, we use the book-equity to book-assets ratio (EAR) of the mul-
tinational bank subsidiary. ECB (2007) analyzes the determinant of bank capital for
74In our dataset, there is no bank subsidiary with di¤ering parent banks during the period of
consideration. Therefore, it is not necessary to include an index k in the regression equation for
the dependent variable and the explanatory variables B and M .
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US and EU-15 banks by using book-equity to book-asset ratios (EAR) and market-
equity to book-asset ratios for robustness reasons. Their results are robust for both
variables. Because of lack of data availability, we restrict our analysis by considering
EARs as the dependent variable only.
The explanatory variables are separated into two groups, where Bit denotes the
bank specic variables of bank i in period t, and Mit variables related to the home
and host markets for each bank i in period t. Again, these two groups can be
separated into variables related to the market of origin (which refer to the supply
side of bank capital) and variables related to the market of operation (which refer to
the demand side of bank capital). Table 6.3 provides an overview of the explanatory
demand side supply side
bank level (B) ROA, ROA 1 PROA, PROA 1
mshare, LAR
market level (M) NPLhost, bcon dGDPc, dSMT ,
dSMG
Table 6.3: Explanatory variables.
variables and their classication. The bank specic factors, referring to the market
of operation, include the return on assets after tax (ROA) and its lagged value
(ROA 1). According to the pecking-order theory (see Myers, 1984), more protable
banks should tend to hold more equity. The lagged return in particular is to control
for the possible e¤ect of internal nancing in terms of accumulated wealth. As a
supply side factor, we also control for the return on assets after tax of the parent
bank (PROA) and its lagged value (PROA 1), since the capital decision of a bank
subsidiary may be inuenced by the parent bank. The variable mshare denotes the
market share (single banks total assets divided by total bank assets in the market)
of a foreign subsidiary in the market of operation and is used as a measure of the
bank size. In theory, the market share should be negatively related to the amount of
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capital banks hold. The reason is on the one hand that due to diversication, larger
rms should be safer and therefore prefer to hold more debt. On the other hand,
larger banks could tend to hold less capital, if they believe they are "too-big-to-fail".
Finally, we use the loans on assets ratio of the multinational subsidiary (LAR) in
order to control for the inuence of the banks activities.
The market related factors, which refer to the supply side of bank capital, account
for the di¤erence in capital market conditions between the country of origin (i.e.
the "home" country) and the market of operation (i.e. the "host" country). Those
variables include the di¤erence between the GDPs per capita in the home and host
countries (dGDPc), the di¤erence in the stock market turnover ratios in the home
and host countries (dSMT ) and the di¤erence in "stock market total value traded to
GDP" in the home and host countries (dSMG).75 Those three variables serve as a
measure of the supply side inuence. Since we interpret the variables GDPc, SMT
and SMG as proxies for the wealth and liquidity of the market for bank capital,
the di¤erence between those variables in the home country and in the host country
gives a measure of the di¤erence in capital market conditions between these two
markets. Hence, the coe¢ cient will give an idea of the importance of the supply
side of bank capital. The three market variables will be used independently in the
panel regression in order to check the robustness of the supply side inuence on the
bankscapital decision in our sample. As a market related factor, referring to the
demand side of bank capital, we use the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans
in the host market (NPLhost). The ratio of bad loans in the host market serves as a
proxy for the level of uncertainty in the market of operation. The coe¢ cient of this
regressor would give information on a potential desire of the bank to insure itself
against ine¢ cient liquidations, as in Diamond & Rajan (2000). In order to control
75Data source of dSMT and dSMG is Beck et al. (2000) and the data source of dGDPc is
Eurostat.
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for specic characteristics of the banking sector in the market of operation (i.e.
the individual CEB country), we employ the variable bcon. This variable contains
information on the market structure of the banking sector, namely the concentration
of banks.76
Finally, t denotes time specic and k group specic e¤ects for all subsidiaries
owned by the multinational bank k. To estimate the specied model, we use xed
e¤ects panel estimation techniques in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the parent bank level and across time that may be correlated with the explanatory
variables. The intuition of using xed e¤ects on the parent bank level is that a
multinational bank as a whole consists of the parent bank, which operates in the
home country, and of its subsidiaries, which operate in host countries. As it is the
parent bank which has to resolve the prot maximization problem, it chooses how
much capital to hold in the parent bank and in the subsidiaries as well, which may
lead to company specic e¤ects not observable to us.77
6.7 Results
The results of the panel regressions with dGDPc as the measure for the inuence of
the supply side for ve di¤erent specications are summarized in table 6.4. The only
signicant coe¢ cients emerging from the xed e¤ects regressions (1) - (5) are the
di¤erence between the GDPs per capita of the home and host markets (dGDPc), on
the one hand, and the ratio of non-performing loans in the host country (NPLhost),
on the other. In contrast, no banks specic regressors were signicant, neither the
76The variable bcon contains the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all commercial
banks in each CEB country (Data source: Beck et al. (2000)).
77Parent banks inuence the operations of foreign subsidiaries in the CEB countries for example
by providing nancial support, setting growth targets or introducing information technology and
monitoring systems. (see EBRD, 2006)
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size measure mshare, the loans to assets ratio (LAR), nor the returns on assets and
their lagged values of the subsidiary as well as of the parent bank. The coe¢ cient
of the proxy for the market structure (bcon) in the host market was insignicant,
too. If we consider the GDP per capita as a proxy for the liquidity and wealth
Dep. Var. EAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dGDPc 0:00039 0:00041 0:00041 0:00037 0:00041
(0:00016) (0:00015) (0:00015) (0:00014) (0:00015)
NPLhost 0:189 0:190 0:191 0:232 0:189
(0:060) (0:061) (0:056) (0:057) (0:056)
PROA  1:40  1:41  1:42    1:22
(0:921) (0:925) (0:913) (0:890)
PROA 1 0:242 0:331 0:326   0:416
(0:641) (0:627) (0:626) (0:618)
ROA 0:039 0:026 0:030 0:126  
(0:404) (0:392) (0:359) (0:357)
ROA 1 0:074 0:043 0:044 0:125  
(0:181) (0:181) (0:176) (0:356)
mshare  0:014  0:001      
(0:052) (0:043)
bcon 2:407 2:541      
(1:833) (1:836)
LAR  0:066        
(0:023)
no. obs. 106 106 106 124 108
R2 0:406 0:405 0:387 0:358 0:383
***, **, *: signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp., standard errors given in brackets;
parent bank and time xed e¤ects included; robust standard errors.
Table 6.4: Results panel regression.
of the market for bank capital, its signicance conrms the importance of home
country conditions (i.e. the supply side) as to the capital decision of a multinational
subsidiary. The positive coe¢ cient of dGDPc can be interpreted as the higher is
the di¤erence between the capital market conditions of the two markets, the more
capital the subsidiary will hold after the takeover. The signicance of the non-
performing loans in the host market conrms the view that higher uncertainty in
the market of operation may induce banks to increase capital as an insurance against
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ine¢ cient liquidation. The positive coe¢ cient of NPLhost reveals that banks hold
more capital if there is higher uncertainty in the market. Therefore, demand side
conditions play a role, too. Both observations reveal that banks face a trade-o¤
between costly bank capital and the probability of being allowed to continue their
operations and preserve their charter value. As to stability, the rst observation
reinforces the relation between the stability of a multinational bank and the capital
market conditions, as in Mikkonen (2006). The second observation goes in the
same direction: if the multinational banks tend to insure themselves against loss of
operations in the host market, they are likely to increase stability.
In a next step, we check the robustness of the supply side inuence by elimin-
ating dGDPc from the regression specication and instead including rst dSMT
(di¤erence between stock market turnover ratios in home and host country), and
second dSMG (di¤erence between stock market total value traded-to-GDP ratio in
home and host country). The results of the regressions (6) and (7) in table 6.5 show
that the coe¢ cient of the demand side measure NPLhost remains highly signicant
with a positive sign. Additionally, the coe¢ cients of the variables mshare and bcon
become signicant. The negative sign of mshare now conrms the view that larger
banks tend to hold less capital. The coe¢ cient of the proxy for the di¤erence in
capital market conditions, which is expressed by dSMT in regression (6), is again
signicant, however with a negative sign. The coe¢ cient reects that banks hold
more capital, if the di¤erence in capital market conditions becomes smaller. Even
though the regressions reveal again a signicant inuence of the supply side, the
sign of the coe¢ cient has changed. Therefore, the inuence of the supply side goes
in the reverse direction. In regression (7), dSMT has been replaced by the variable
dSMG. Again, the coe¢ cient of NPLhost remains highly signicant, conrming
the relevance of demand side conditions. The coe¢ cients of the variables mshare
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Dep. Var. EAR
(6) (7)
dSMT  3:313 dSMG  4:729
(1:495) (2:601)
NPLhost 0:366 NPLhost 0:328
(0:061) (0:053)
PROA  0:881 PROA  1:099
(1:134) (1:146)
PROA 1 0:211 PROA 1 0:744
(0:664) (0:841)
ROA 0:192 ROA 0:179
(0:444) (0:447)
ROA 1 0:186 ROA 1 0:213
(0:167) (0:173)
mshare  0:090 mshare  0:0864
(0:044) (0:043)
bcon 4:201 bcon 3:259
(1:883) (1:813)
LAR  0:025 LAR  0:022
(0:020) (0:021)
no. obs. 106 106
R2 0:388 0:376
***, **, *: signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.;
standard errors in brackets; parent bank and time xed e¤ects included;
robust standard errors.
Table 6.5: Robutstness check of supply side inuence.
and bcon remain signicant, too. The coe¢ cient of the supply side proxy dSMG is,
again, signicant with a negative sign. As with dSMT , the estimation reveals that
a reduction of the di¤erence in capital market condition between home and host
country - measured by dSMG - leads to an increase in bank capital.
The opposite inuence of our supply side measures with dGDPc on the one side
and dSMT and dSMG on the other raises the question which measure is better
suitable to capture the inuence of the supply side on the capital decision of banks
in our sample. A closer look at the dataset reveals that banks with Austrian parent
banks seem to be a special case, because the variables dSMG and dSMT for those
banks have a negative sign in most cases. Taking dSMG and dSMT seriously as a
115
6. COSTLY BANK CAPITAL - DEMAND AND SUPPLY
measure for the di¤erence in wealth and liquidity between two certain markets, this
would mean that wealth and liquidity for example in Slovenia and Slovakia is higher
compared to Austria. As one would expect, looking at dGDPc reveals exactly the
opposite nding - therefore GDPc seems to be a better measure to capture the
wealth of the shareholders. Eliminating banks with Austrian parent banks from our
dataset, the regressions with dSMG and dSMT as explanatory variables as to the
supply side show positive coe¢ cients, although they are insignicant (see table 6.6,
regression (8) and (9)). Repeating the panel regression with dGDPc as a measure
for supply-side inuence without banks with Austrian parent banks conrms the
result of a signicant and positive coe¢ cient of the variable dGDPc (see table 6.6,
regression (10)). In all three regressions, the coe¢ cient of NPLhost remains highly
signicant with a positive sign.
Altogether, the empirical analysis shows a robust and signicant inuence of
conditions in the market of operation, which are related with the demand side of
bank capital. This nding conrms the view that banks obviously have the desire
to insure themselves against ine¢ cient liquidations, as emphasized in Diamond &
Rajan (2000). Furthermore, we nd partial evidence that conditions in the market
of the source of bank capital, which are related to the supply side, also inuence
the capital decision of banks in our sample. However, the statistically signicant
inuence of the supply side depends on the measure used to capture those e¤ects.
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Dep. Var. EAR
(8) (9) (10)
dSMT 0:481 dSMG 1:225 dGDPc 0:00152
(0:936) (1:398) (0:0006)
NPLhost 0:204 NPLhost 0:214 NPLhost 0:196
(0:053) (0:051) (0:048)
PROA  0:462 PROA  0:472 PROA  0:301
(0:790) (0:764) (0:735)
PROA 1 0:754 PROA 1 0:535 PROA 1 0:832
(0:714) (0:662) (0:753)
ROA 0:326 ROA 0:254 ROA 0:173
(0:459) (0:476) (0:493)
ROA 1 0:149 ROA 1 0:139 ROA 1 0:117
(0:213) (0:210) (0:205)
mshare  0:016 mshare  0:019 mshare  0:018
(0:041) (0:042) (0:039)
bcon 3:176 bcon 3:287 bcon 3:398
(2:127) (1:959) (1:803)
LAR  0:008 LAR  0:008 LAR  0:007
(0:023) (0:024) (0:222)
no. obs. 91 91 91
R2 0:337 0:353 0:425
***, **, *: signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1, 5, 10% level resp.; standard errors in brackets; parent
bank and time xed e¤ects included, robust standard errors.
Table 6.6: Regressions without banks with Austrian parent banks.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the determination of bank
capital by including supply side related factors to panel regressions for the rst time
to our knowledge. In so doing, we follow the theoretical models originating from the
work of Gorton &Winton (1995). We use multinational bank subsidiaries, operating
in the CEB countries, as a natural experiment for distinguishing the factors related
to the market of origin from those related to the market of operation.
Our dataset shows a large dispersion in the capital ratios of domestic banks as
well as multinational bank subsidiaries, which leads to the conjecture that banks
face a trade-o¤ in their capital decision. Tests on the means of bank capital ratios
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in the CEB countries show that, in a given market, multinational banks may behave
di¤erently than the domestic ones. This gives support for the importance of the
supply side. Besides the relevance of demand side conditions, panel regressions
conrm partially - depending on the measure chosen as an explanatory variable
- that the supply side related factors have a signicant inuence on the capital
decision of multinational bank subsidiaries, operating in the banking markets of
the CEB countries. What is more, in relation to the model in Mikkonen (2006),
we are able to conclude that the multinational banks in the CEB countries may
be stability increasing rather than stability decreasing. However, as the di¤erence
between the home and host capital markets becomes smaller, the motives driving
internationalization may change. It may then be that the international banks are
both more likely to go bankrupt and leave the market when bad times occur.
We managed to nd a specic market where supply side factors obviously play
a role in determining bank capital, and where the stability e¤ect of multinational
banking may be positive. It remains to be investigated whether other markets have
di¤erent determinants. The ultimate aim would then be to develop a theory of
banking where internationalization motives arise from the market characteristics
and where those motives have stability consequences.
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6.A Comparison of EAR Means and Distributions
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [ 95% Conf. Interval]
Domestic 137 8.677007 .2373747 2.7784 8.207584 9.14643
Multinational 213 9.314883 .2400889 3.503983 8.841615 9.78815
Combined 350 9.0652 .1737287 3.250167 8.723513 9.406887
Di¤ -.6378753 .3376233 -1.302018 .0262678
Satterthwaites degrees of freedom : 333.013
Ho : mean (Dom) - mean (Mul) = di¤ = 0
Ha : di¤ < 0 Ha : di¤ != 0 Ha : di¤ > 0
t = - 1.8893 t = - 1.8893 t = - 1.8893
P < t = 0.0299 P > | t | = 0.0597 P > t = 0.9701
Table 6.7: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances on EAR of domestic and multina-
tional banks.
(1) all eight countries included:
Smaller Group D P-value Corrected
Domestic : 0.1018 0.178
Multinational : -0.0135 0.970
Combined K-S: 0.1018 0.353 0.306
(2) Slovenia excluded:
Domestic : 0.1534 0.042
Multinational : -0.0360 0.840
Combined K-S: 0.1534 0.083 0.063
Table 6.8: Two-sample Kolmogorov - Smirnov test on EAR of domestic and multinational
banks.
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